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 Section 1983 no longer serves as a remedial statute for the people 
most in need of its protection.  Those who have suffered a violation 
of their civil rights at the hands of state authorities, but who cannot 
afford a lawyer because they have only modest damages or seek 
only equitable remedies, are foreclosed from relief, because lawyers 
shun their cases.  Today civil rights plaintiffs are treated the same as 
ordinary tort plaintiffs by the private bar: without high damages, 
civil rights plaintiffs are denied access to the courts because no one 
will represent them. 
 Congress understood that civil rights laws are only as good as 
their enforcement.  When Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, it wanted to ensure that 
meritorious claims would be heard and that all illegal conduct 
would be deterred.  The enforcement mechanism that Congress 
chose—fee-shifting—guaranteed access to the courts even when 
damages were modest or the form of relief was equitable.  So-called 
“private attorneys general” would accept all meritorious claims, 
knowing that if they won they would be paid by the liable 
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defendants at reasonable market rates pursuant to the fee-shifting 
provisions of the law. 
 In 1986, however, in Evans v. Jeff D., the U.S. Supreme Court 
allowed defendants to condition settlement of civil rights cases on 
the waiver or reduction of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.  Two decades 
later, it is evident that Evans destroyed the enforcement mechanism 
of the Civil Rights Act.  Today civil rights plaintiffs who have only 
modest damages or who seek equitable relief are without a remedy.  
Although fee waivers (and their effects) were the subject of much 
debate after Evans was decided, in recent years the issue has 
dropped off the radar screen.  It is time for Congress to amend the 
Fees Act in order to resurrect section 1983 as the robust remedial 
law Congress meant it to be. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n the second half of the twentieth century, the Civil Rights Act1 
became the paradigmatic federal remedial statute.  Section 1983 
held state governmental actors accountable for violating people’s civil 
rights.  Yet for many people today, section 1983 provides no remedy.  
The courtroom doors are closed to those who seek injunctive relief or 
lack high damages, because no lawyers will take their cases.  The 
failure to provide these people with access to justice has largely gone 
unnoticed in recent years, especially in Congress.  This Article calls 
attention to the problem by declaiming last rites for section 1983. 
It is beyond question that Congress intended section 1983 to 
benefit people who could not afford a lawyer.  In 1976, Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act.2  The Fees Act 
guaranteed that even those who could not afford a lawyer would have 
access to the courts by virtue of the ingenious device of fee-shifting.  
Fee-shifting makes defendants liable for the prevailing plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees,3 thus creating an incentive for private lawyers to take 
civil rights cases even when the damages are too low to make those 
cases otherwise profitable.  As the Senate Report on the bill noted, “If 
our civil rights laws are not to become mere hollow pronouncements 
which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the 
traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases.”4  The 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), is credited with giving 
new life to a statute that had been mostly dormant for the preceding ninety years.  Monroe both 
expanded the range of state action that could be challenged under section 1983 and limited the 
range of defenses that could be raised.  See, e.g., 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, § 2:2 (4th ed. 2006). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)) 
[hereinafter Fees Act]. 
 3. In writing about attorney’s fees, one must first decide the delicate “‘threshold issue of 
style’ bedeviling courts and commentators for decades now: Of the eleven alternatives, what is 
the correct terminology and spelling of the payment for the work of the prevailing party’s 
lawyer?”  Gil Deford, The Prevailing Winds After Buckhannon, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313, 
313 n.2 (2002).  I will take the majority position and use the singular possessive adjective and the 
plural noun.  Haymond v. Lundy, 205 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  This is also 
permitted by my home circuit.  See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 290 n.1 (6th Cir. 
1997). 
 4. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976).  Senator Edward Kennedy, who sponsored the 
amended version of the Fees Act, put it this way: “Long experience has demonstrated . . . that 
Government enforcement alone cannot accomplish [compliance with the civil rights laws].  
Private enforcement of these laws by those most directly affected must continue to receive full 
congressional support.  Fee shifting provides a mechanism which can give full effect to our civil 
rights laws, at no added cost to the Government.”  122 CONG. REC. 31, 472 (1976).  The House 
Report contained similar sentiments: “The effect of the [Fees Act] will be to promote the 
I 
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idea—well proven in the ten years after the bill’s enactment—was 
that fee-shifting would produce a corps of “private attorneys general” 
to take on illegal state action on a case by case basis, for profit. 
In 1986, however, in Evans v. Jeff D.,5 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that defendants in civil rights lawsuits6 could condition settlement on 
the waiver of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.  Evans gave states a 
powerful new defense weapon.  By pitting plaintiffs against their own 
lawyers, defendants acting under color of state law could eliminate or 
greatly reduce their exposure for fees.7  At the same time, every 
“Evans offer” accepted would deter plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing 
future cases because, despite the victory for their clients, the losing 
lawyers would be unlikely to take on the state again. 
Twenty-plus years later, it is clear that Evans destroyed section 
1983 as a remedy for civil rights plaintiffs with only modest damages.  
Evans foreclosed relief for those plaintiffs by driving their lawyers out 
of the civil rights business.  Evans also severely limited section 1983 as 
a remedy for plaintiffs seeking equitable relief, by driving their 
lawyers out of the civil rights business.  In both cases, Evans rendered 
the “private attorney general” an extinct species. 
Evans pushed a small shockwave into the public-
interest/plaintiffs’ bar.  Before Evans, many plaintiffs’ lawyers (and 
many defense lawyers as well) had assumed that settlement offers 
conditioning relief on the waiver or reduction8 of the plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees were unethical,9 or were barred by the Fees Act itself.  
 
enforcement of the . . . civil rights acts, as Congress intended, and to achieve uniformity in those 
statutes and justice for all citizens.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 9 (1976). 
 5. 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
 6. Although I mean cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, much of this article applies 
equally to other remedial statutes with fee-shifting provisions. 
 7. In 1986, absent a fee waiver, a settlement would have entitled the plaintiff class to 
reasonable attorney’s fees at market rates, payable to the “prevailing party” under the fee-
shifting provisions of the Fees Act. 
 8. The most common form of an Evans offer is a lump sum offer, which forces the plaintiff 
and the lawyer to negotiate who will receive what share of the settlement dollars.  The offer is 
designed to be high enough that the plaintiff cannot reject it, but low enough that the plaintiff’s 
lawyer will be significantly underpaid. 
 9. Some state bar ethics boards had prohibited such offers (or had signaled tacit 
disapproval of them).   See Evans, 475 U.S. at 728 n.15 (citing bar opinions from New York, 
Maine, and the District of Columbia, as well as one state ethics board (Georgia) that had 
approved the practice of simultaneous negotiations).  Other states had skirted the issue, so that 
the practice—even if discouraged—would not subject a lawyer to discipline for making a 
combined merits-and-fees offer.  See, e.g., State Bar of Michigan, Formal Ethics Op. C-235 
(1985); Connecticut Informal Ethics Op. 85-19 (1985). 
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In Evans, however, the Court rejected both claims, thus altering the 
balance of power in the negotiation of civil rights cases. 
After Evans, there was a brief flurry of activity to minimize its 
harm.  Publicly-funded legal aid lawyers and private plaintiffs’ civil 
rights attorneys scrambled to rewrite their retainer agreements to 
avoid Evans problems.  But few of those retainers were tested, and 
the practical and ethical issues inherent in them were never 
satisfactorily resolved.  Ten years later, in 1996, when Congress barred 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) offices from accepting attorney’s 
fees in all cases,10 the Evans problem disappeared for federally-funded 
lawyers.  But private plaintiffs’ civil rights lawyers and non-LSC 
public interest lawyers remain subject to settlement offers 
conditioned on the waiver or reduction of statutory attorney’s fees. 
In the first section of this Article, I review Evans and its effect on 
civil rights practice in the two decades since its publication.  In the 
second section, I describe the plaintiffs’ bar’s efforts to contract 
around Evans, and I explain why those efforts were unsuccessful.  In 
the third section, I address the special problem of injunctive relief.  In 
the fourth section, I describe changes since Evans that have made civil 
rights cases even less attractive to private plaintiffs’ lawyers, and I 
briefly review the available data on civil rights filings.  In the last 
section, I address how Congress can revive the Fees Act to restore the 
benefits of pre-Evans practice and breathe new life into section 1983. 
I.  EVANS V. JEFF D. 
A. An Overview of the Case 
Evans is now old enough that many readers will have forgotten its 
specifics.  The Idaho Legal Aid Society filed suit against state officials 
on behalf of a class of disabled children.  The plaintiffs’ core claims 
 
 10. From the start, the Legal Services Corporation Act restricted the use of LSC funds.  See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e–2996f (1974).  More restrictions were added over the years.  In 1996, an 
unusually hostile Congress imposed sweeping new restrictions, limiting the practice of LSC 
lawyers.  The 1996 amendments barred LSC offices from participating in class action litigation 
and from collecting or retaining “attorney’s fees pursuant to any federal or state law permitting 
or requiring the awarding of such fees.”  See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 504(a)(7), 504(a)(13), 110 Stat. 1321, 1353–
54 (1996).  The only restriction to have been successfully challenged was section 504(a)(16), 
which prohibited advocacy “to amend or otherwise challenge existing law.”  The Supreme Court 
struck down that restriction on First Amendment grounds in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 
531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
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were that Idaho’s educational and medical services for the children 
were constitutionally deficient, and thus actionable under section 
1983. 
The parties quickly worked out a settlement as to the educational 
services, and counsel signed a stipulation disposing of that piece of the 
case.  The agreement provided that each side would bear its own 
attorney’s fees and costs incurred to that point.  The district court 
entered an order approving the partial settlement.11  The parties could 
not agree, however, as to the medical services, so the case went 
forward.  As the Idaho Legal Aid Society’s time spent on the case 
escalated, the defendants’ settlement proposals always included a 
demand for a waiver of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, while the 
plaintiffs’ counter-proposals rejected any fee waiver.  Indeed, the 
Legal Aid Society instructed its lawyer handling the case to turn down 
any proposal conditioned on the waiver of fees.12   
Cross motions for summary judgment narrowed the plaintiffs’ 
claims, but the district court eventually set the case for trial.  A week 
before trial, the state defendants made a new proposal that offered 
virtually all the injunctive relief the plaintiffs had sought in their 
complaint, and “more than the district court in earlier hearings had 
indicated it was willing to grant.”13  Faced with an offer that gave the 
plaintiffs everything they wanted (except fees), the plaintiffs’ lawyer 
“ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients 
mandated acceptance of the proposal.”14  He signed the consent 
decree—which included a waiver of attorney’s fees—“if so approved 
by the Court.”15 
The lawyer then asked the court to approve the settlement except 
for the waiver of fees.  At the hearing on that motion, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer argued first that the defendants’ offer exploited his ethical 
duty to his clients.  He said that he was effectively “forced” to waive 
his fees or lose the ideal settlement on the merits and go forward to 
trial.16  Second, he argued that a settlement conditioned on the waiver 
 
 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring class settlements to be court-approved). 
 12. Evans, 475 U.S. at 722. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 722 n.5. 
 16. Id. at 723–24.  Evans was complicated by the fact that the lead counsel was not just the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer but also their “next friend” on the pleadings.  His dual role highlighted the 
ethical dilemma because, as the decision-maker for the class, he would have had to negotiate 
with himself about the relative value of the settlement versus the fees.  Thus, having created an 
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of fees violated the policy underlying the fee-shifting provisions of the 
Fees Act. 
The defendants countered that the settlement was no different 
from any other commercial settlement involving the expenditure of 
state funds.  That is, they claimed that the promised medical services 
were not required by law, but the defendants were willing to provide 
them to put an end to the litigation and to cap the state’s costs.  The 
plaintiffs, according to the defendants, were free to accept or reject 
the settlement offer, the same as in any other litigation.  What the 
plaintiffs could not get was both the settlement and their attorney’s 
fees.17 
The district court sided with the defendants.  It denied the 
plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and issued a stay pending appeal.18  On 
appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, invalidating the fee waiver while 
leaving the rest of the consent decree intact.  The court relied on 
circuit precedent that “‘disapproved simultaneous negotiation of 
settlements and attorney’s fees’ absent a showing of ‘unusual 
circumstances.’”19  The Ninth Circuit said that any other rule would 
violate the “strong federal policy embodied in the Fees Act,” which 
“normally requires an award of fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil 
rights actions, including those who have prevailed through 
settlement.”20  The court remanded the case for a determination of 
reasonable attorney’s fees, finding that “[t]he historical background of 
both rule 23 and section 1983, as well as our experience since their 
enactment, compel the conclusion that a stipulated waiver of all 
attorney’s fees obtained solely as a condition for obtaining relief for 
the class should not be accepted by the court.”21 
 
internal conflict of interest, he had little choice but to trade Idaho Legal Aid’s fees for his “next 
friends’” advantageous settlement. 
 17. Id. at 721–24. 
 18. The record is silent as to whether or not, at this point, the plaintiffs’ counsel felt that he 
had a similar ethical obligation to drop the appeal.  The situation had not changed.  As long as 
the stay remained in effect, the class would not get the medical services the defendants had 
agreed to supply, only because the plaintiffs’ lawyer, acting as their next friend, had chosen to 
appeal the case in order to win back the fees he had waived (in return for relief) in the first 
place.  The plaintiffs’ counsel sought and got emergency orders in the court of appeals requiring 
enforcement pending the appeal.  Id. at 724. 
 19. Id. at 725 (quoting Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1984)).  The precedent 
cited was Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980), which had disapproved the 
simultaneous negotiation of merits and fees to avoid conflict between the plaintiffs and their 
attorneys. 
 20. Evans, 475 U.S. at 724–25. 
 21. Id. at 725 (quoting Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d at 652). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a circuit 
split on this issue.22  In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the 
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.  The Court said, first, that “Rule 
23(e) does not give a court the power, in advance of trial, to modify a 
proposed consent decree and order its acceptance over either party’s 
objection.”23  Thus, if the fee waiver in Evans violated public policy, 
the entire agreement was unenforceable—the court of appeals could 
not rewrite the consent decree to suit the court’s own sense of what 
ought to be done.  The only question, therefore, said the Court, was 
whether “the District Court had a duty to reject the proposed 
settlement because it included a waiver of statutorily authorized 
attorney’s fees.”24 
The majority gave the plaintiffs’ ethical argument short shrift, 
disposing of it in a single paragraph: 
[W]e do not believe that the “dilemma” was an “ethical” one in the 
sense that [the lawyer] had to choose between conflicting duties 
under the prevailing norms of professional conduct.  Plainly, [the 
lawyer] had no ethical obligation to seek a statutory fee award.  
His ethical duty was to serve his clients loyally and competently.  
Since the proposal to settle the merits was more favorable than the 
probable outcome of the trial, [his] decision to recommend 
acceptance was consistent with the highest standards of our 
profession.  The District Court, therefore, correctly concluded that 
approval of the settlement involved no breach of ethics in this 
case.25 
The Court said that the defect, if any, in the negotiated fee waiver 
must be traced not to the rules of ethics but to the Fees Act.26 
 
 22. The Ninth Circuit, in Mendoza, 623 F.2d at 1338, and the Third Circuit, in Prandini v. 
National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (1977), had strongly discouraged simultaneous negotiation of 
merits and fees, while four circuits had permitted it, at least in some circumstances.  Evans, 475 
U.S. at 726 n.10. 
 23. Evans, 475 U.S. at 727. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 727–28 (footnotes omitted).  The thorny ethical issue, of course, was not whether 
the plaintiffs’ LSC attorneys could accept the offer and renounce their own fees, but whether 
they were required to.  On that question, the Court’s analysis was singularly unhelpful. 
 26. The Court noted that there was no fee agreement because the plaintiffs were minors 
and one of the lawyers was their next friend.  “[The] special character of both the class and its 
attorney-client relationship . . . explains why [Legal Aid] did not enter into any agreement 
covering the various contingencies that might arise during the course of settlement negotiations 
of a class action of this kind.”  Id.  at 721. 
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Turning to the purpose of the Fees Act, the Court found that 
although Congress expected the fee-shifting provision to attract so-
called “private attorneys general” to vindicate the rights of people 
deprived of their civil rights, Congress wrote into the Act only “a 
statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney’s fees,” and it 
gave that eligibility only to the prevailing party.27  Congress did not 
give the attorney a right to the fees, nor did it intend to render them 
non-negotiable “any more than it intended to bar a concession on 
damages to secure broader injunctive relief.”28  Accordingly, the Court 
said that the fee-shifting provision should be viewed as simply one of 
“the arsenal of remedies available to combat violations of civil 
rights.”29 
In dissent, Justice Brennan reviewed the statutory history of the 
Fees Act in detail.30  He argued that the Act’s primary purpose was to 
induce private lawyers to handle plaintiffs’ civil rights cases.  In his 
view, that inducement must be preserved even at the cost of losing 
some settlements.  He wrote that simultaneous negotiation of the 
merits and fees should therefore be limited to ensure that plaintiffs’ 
 
 27. Id. at 730. 
 28. Id. at 731. 
 29. Id. at 732. 
 30. Id. at 745–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The legislative history of the Fees Act is both 
atypically thick and unusually consistent and clear.  See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in 
the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 
309–15, 364 n.422 (1990) (noting that the history is more than 300 pages long, with almost no 
disagreement, and that the bill passed 57-15 in the Senate and 306-68 in the House).  From the 
statutory history, Brand identifies the Fees Act’s intended “benchmarks” as (1) attracting 
lawyers for private enforcement of the civil rights laws; (2) increasing the number of civil rights 
cases by increasing access to lawyers; (3) ensuring competitive rates to accomplish (1) and (2); 
and (4) promoting close supervision over fee issues decided by the district courts.  Id.; see also 
James Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney’s Fees by Civil 
Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attorney’s 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REV. 597, 603–04 (1984).  Perhaps the most eloquent 
statement of the bill’s purpose was made by its original sponsor: 
The problem of unequal access to the courts in order to vindicate congressional 
policies and enforce the law is not simply a problem for lawyers and courts.  
Encouraging adequate representation is essential if the laws of this Nation are to be 
enforced.  Congress passes a great deal of lofty legislation promising equal rights to 
all.  Although some of these laws can be enforced by the Justice Department or other 
Federal agencies, most of the responsibility for enforcement has to rest upon private 
citizens, who must go to court to prove a violation of law. . . .  But without the 
availability of counsel fees, these rights exist only on paper.  Private citizens must be 
given not only the rights to go to court, but also the legal resources.  If the citizen does 
not have the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which 
he seeks to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire nation, not just the 
individual citizen, suffers. 
122 CONG. REC. 33, 313 (1976) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
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lawyers earn a reasonable fee.  Of special force was Justice Brennan’s 
concession that fees could still be negotiated across a considerable 
range, as long as the final settlement—subject to the district court’s 
approval—provided for a reasonable fee.  He thought that all the 
benefits of simultaneous negotiation, including the defendants’ need 
to know the bottom line, could thus be preserved without 
jeopardizing the primary statutory purpose of the Fees Act: to attract 
lawyers to handle civil rights cases that would otherwise go 
unlitigated.  Justice Brennan said that the Court had put its own 
judicial policy (to promote settlements in order to reduce dockets) 
over Congress’s statutory policy to guarantee lawyers for civil rights 
plaintiffs.31 
Justice Brennan’s concern was that once the practice of 
negotiating fee waivers had the Court’s imprimatur, defense counsel 
would invariably use it.  Indeed, he thought that defense lawyers 
would be “remiss not to demand that the plaintiff waive statutory 
attorney’s fees,” and he predicted that “in the future, we must expect 
settlement offers routinely to contain demands for waivers of 
statutory fees.”32  Brennan foresaw that routine fee waiver demands 
would drive “private attorneys general” out of the market for civil 
rights cases.   
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens belittled Brennan’s 
concern: 
We are cognizant of the possibility that decisions by individual 
clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the 
long run, diminish lawyers’ expectations of statutory fees in civil 
rights cases.  If this occurred, the pool of lawyers willing to 
represent plaintiffs in such cases might shrink, constricting the 
“effective access to the judicial process” for persons with civil 
rights grievances which the Fees Act was intended to provide.  
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976).  That the “tyranny of small 
 
 31. Evans, 475 U.S. at 755–66.  Both at the time and since, commentators have strongly 
supported Justice Brennan’s view that in Evans the Court ignored or understated the primary 
purpose of the Fees Act—to enforce the civil rights acts by inducing private lawyers to take 
cases that they otherwise could not afford to accept.  See, e.g., Brand, supra note 30, at 363; 
Daniel L. Lowery, “Prevailing Party” Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-shifting’s Shifting 
Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1141, 1446 (1993); Jay H. Krulewitch, Note, Anatomy of a Double 
Whammy: The Application of Rule 68 Offers and Fee Waivers of Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
under Section 1988, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 103, 105, 128 (1987/1988); Randy M. Stedman, Note, 
Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting Private Attorneys General on Waiver, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1289 
(1988). 
 32. Evans, 475 U.S. at 758. 
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decisions” may operate in this fashion is not to say there is any 
reason or documentation to support such a concern at the present 
time.  Comment on this issue is therefore premature at this 
juncture.  We believe, however, that as a practical matter the 
likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote.33 
More than two decades later, we can see whose crystal ball was 
clearer.  If anything, Justice Brennan was too sanguine, and Justice 
Stevens was just plain wrong.  Although we lack an absolute empirical 
answer,34 there is much evidence (and near unanimity within the 
plaintiffs’ bar) that Evans killed section 1983 as a remedial statute for 
plaintiffs in need of private lawyers to litigate civil rights cases 
involving only modest damages or equitable relief.  Today the 
“tyranny of small decisions” is the ruling order.  Upon reflection, and 
as Justice Brennan and a host of commentators35 foresaw, this result is 
wholly unsurprising.36 
B. The Effects of Evans Since 1986 
1. What Section 1988 Was Supposed to Do—The “American 
rule” on attorney’s fees has long held that parties should bear their 
 
 33. Id. at 741 n.34 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 34. No one has done a formal long-term empirical study of this issue, but Julie Davies 
interviewed some thirty-five plaintiffs’ civil rights lawyers in 1996–97 to try to get a handle on 
the effect of Evans and other cases that had made winning attorney’s fees more difficult.  See 
Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between Reality and 
Theory, 48 HAST. L.J. 197 (1997).  Her conclusion was that most civil rights cases are treated no 
differently from other tort cases, and that therefore unless the plaintiff has substantial damages, 
the plaintiff will not find a lawyer to represent him.  Id. at 261–67.  See also Daniel Nazer, Note, 
Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 499, 537–38 
(2004) (agreeing with Davies as to the private bar, but arguing that Evans had a less pronounced 
effect in non-profit settings).  Both authors understate the effect of Evans to the extent that they 
report that demands for fee waivers are relatively rare.  In practice it is nearly always fee 
reductions that preclude plaintiffs’ lawyers from making money on civil rights cases, not full fee 
waivers.  See infra Part II. 
 35. See, e.g., David Paul Enzminger, Case Note, Waive Goodbye to Law in the Public 
Interest: The Use of Coercive Waivers in Civil Rights Actions, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 
(1986), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749 (1987); F. Allen Phaup II, Case Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: Putting the 
Squeeze on Private Attorneys General, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 389 (1987); Debra Watts 
McCormick, The Effect of Evans v. Jeff D. on Civil Rights Litigation, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
415, 416 (1987); Judy Elledge, Note, Evans v. Jeff D.: No Judicial Prohibition of Coerced 
Waivers of Attorney’s Fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 24 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1987); Stedman, supra note 31; Krulewitch, supra note 31; Neil M. 
Goldstein, Comment, Preserving Fee-Shifting after Evans v. Jeff D.: Joint Attorney/Client 
Control of Settlement, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 267 (1989). 
 36. What is surprising is that Congress has allowed the failure of the Fees Act to persist for 
two decades. 
01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:32:30 AM 
12 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 3:1 
own costs of litigation.  An exception developed, however, where a 
plaintiff’s success established or vindicated important public rights.37  
The plaintiff was said to have acted as a “private attorney general” 
not just for the plaintiff’s own benefit but in the public interest.38  By 
the 1970s, U.S. courts were beginning to award attorney’s fees in such 
cases, even if the underlying statute did not contain a fee-shifting 
provision.  In 1975, however, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society,39 the U.S. Supreme Court put a halt to that 
practice.  The Court held that only Congress, and not the courts, 
could change the American rule and authorize fee-shifting. 
Congress reacted swiftly, passing the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act in 1976.40  The Fees Act permitted courts to award 
reasonable attorney’s fees (at market rates) to prevailing plaintiffs in 
civil rights actions.  The statutory history of section 1988 made clear 
that its purpose was to guarantee enforcement of the Civil Rights Act 
through the “private attorneys general” model.41  The Congressional 
Record was filled with comments by the bill’s supporters that without 
fee-shifting the poor and underprivileged would have legal rights 
without a remedy: absent fee-shifting, the courthouse door would be 
barred to them. 
2. Damages Cases: Comparing Fee-Shifting to the Normal Tort 
Regime—In thinking about the effect of Evans, it is useful to look at 
the conventional tort regime that matches plaintiffs with tort lawyers 
 
 37. For a useful review of the development of this exception to the American rule, see 
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
636, 666 (1974). 
 38. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), the Court 
had held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should 
ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances rendered such an award unjust—even 
though on its face the Act made the granting of fees discretionary with the district court.  The 
Court said that when the Act was passed, Congress knew that enforcement would prove difficult 
and that the nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing 
broad compliance with the law.  Such litigation “is thus private in form only,” because if a 
plaintiff obtains relief, he does so “not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ 
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”  Id. at 401–02.  The term 
“private attorney general” has been traced back to Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries 
of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See David Shub, Note, Private 
Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties, and Public Benefit: Attorney’s Fees Awards for Civil 
Rights Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706, 708 n.10 (1992). 
 39. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)). 
 41. In Evans, Justice Brennan said the statutory history established the point with 
“monotonous clarity.”  Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 749 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  See 
also Brand, supra note 30, at 309–15. 
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through the marketplace.42  In most tort cases, where fee-shifting is 
not part of the equation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid on a contingent 
fee basis.  The lawyer must therefore do a careful cost–benefit 
analysis to determine if she43 can make money on a case.  The lawyer 
knows she will have to pay the litigation expenses up front, and she 
assumes she will be paid (in the form of a contingent fee) only if she 
wins a favorable verdict or settlement.44  Most plaintiffs’ lawyers 
therefore will not take a contingent-fee case unless: (1) the claim is 
strong enough to give the defense reasonable pause about going to 
trial; and (2) the damages are high enough that the lawyer’s 
contingent share of any settlement will pay a reasonable return on 
what the lawyer has invested in the case, at the point when settlement 
is likely to occur. 
At bottom—from the perspective of plaintiffs’ lawyers—there are 
just four categories of contingent tort cases, which can be set out in 
the following rough matrix: 
 
1. Good Liability/Good Damages 3. Bad Liability/Good Damages 
2. Good Liability/Bad Damages 4. Bad Liability/Bad Damages 
 
I will briefly review the four categories, the choices the plaintiff’s 
lawyer must make with each, and how fee-shifting laws like section 
1988 change the calculation. 
Category One: Good Liability/Good Damages—The good-
liability/good-damages case is the case every tort lawyer wants.  
Although the lawyer always has some small risk of an outright loss (or 
of her client being risk-averse and accepting a settlement below the 
 
 42. For this discussion I assume that the civil rights plaintiff is seeking damages, and not 
just injunctive relief.  I discuss injunctive relief in Part III, infra. 
 43. For the sake of clarity and consistency, throughout this discussion I will use the singular 
masculine pronoun “he” when referring to the client, and the singular feminine pronoun “she” 
when referring to the lawyer.  Because there are usually multiple defendants (and often multiple 
defense lawyers) in a case, I will refer to the defendants and their counsel using the plural 
pronoun “they.” 
 44. The percentage of the contingent fee is controlled by state law and varies considerably.  
For example, Michigan caps the contingent fee in tort cases at one-third, see MICH. CT. R. 
8.121(B) (1985) (setting the one-third cap on fees); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.5 
(2006) (requiring that fees be “reasonable” and enumerating factors to be considered in 
evaluating reasonableness), while Oklahoma permits the lawyer and client to work as equal 
partners, sharing the recovery 50/50.  See, e.g., Martin v. Buckman, 883 P.2d 185, 192 (Okla. 
App. Div. 4 1994) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 5 § 7 (1991)). 
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“value” of the case), the odds are high that the lawyer will earn a 
hefty contingent fee.  Indeed, translated into hourly rates the 
contingent fee may strike the public and the defense bar (and often 
the bench) as too high.45 
A civil rights plaintiff with a good-liability/good-damages case can 
therefore always find a lawyer, with or without a fee-shifting law.  Fee-
shifting is not necessary for this plaintiff to retain counsel because the 
contingent fee system takes care of him in the same way that it takes 
care of non-civil-rights tort plaintiffs with good-liability/good-
damages claims.  No extra inducement is needed for the lawyer to 
take the case because the competition for good-liability/good-
damages cases is always keen: lawyers line up for them.46 
Category Two: Good Liability/Bad Damages—The good-
liability/bad-damages case, whether in tort or civil rights, is almost 
never accepted by the plaintiffs’ bar.  The plaintiff’s lawyer has little 
bargaining power because the claim is not worth much.  This is no 
secret—the defense attorneys, too, know that the claim is not worth 
much, and the defense can put great pressure on the plaintiff’s lawyer 
by running up her hours with motions and discovery.  Very soon 
every extra hour that the plaintiff’s lawyer puts into the case is an 
hour lost, as the lawyer’s time exceeds the value of the contingent 
percentage of any reasonable settlement or verdict.47  In effect, the 
defense can paper the plaintiff’s lawyer to death, until she has no 
choice but to cut her losses.  The more successful or seasoned the 
plaintiff’s lawyer, the less likely she is to accept a good-liability/bad-
damages case in the first instance.48 
For this category, fee-shifting radically changes the client’s ability 
to hire a lawyer.  With a fee-shifting regime in a good-liability/bad-
 
 45. The justification for the high fee is that it is a reward for the risk that the plaintiff’s 
lawyer takes.  Even with good-liability/good-damages cases, some of the cases may still be lost 
or settle at a loss, after the lawyer has spent a lot of time and money on them. 
 46. Competition for clients takes the form of aggressive advertising—or elaborate displays 
of past success—rather than price competition.  I have yet to see a lawyer’s ad that read, 
“Lowest percentage on the market—will not be undersold.” 
 47. Occasionally a novice tort lawyer might get stuck with one of these cases.   Having no 
other work to do, she might foolishly say yes to a case that will cost more to litigate than she can 
recover.  The lesson will be painful and one not soon forgotten. 
 48. One exception to this generalization is the overwhelmingly strong case with low 
damages, which a lawyer might accept on the theory that she can get a quick settlement for very 
little work.  Such a case may settle even before the filing of a lawsuit.  But the prototypical 
good-liability/bad-damages case is rejected out of hand by the private bar, because litigation 
costs will exceed any likely recovery. 
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damages case, the lawyer expects to be paid not from a percentage of 
the settlement or verdict but by the defendants pursuant to the fee-
shifting law.  The lawyer who takes the case expects to win (good 
liability), and expects to earn a reasonable hourly rate for her services, 
paid by the defendants.  In short, the “private attorneys general” 
model is the only way a client with a good-liability/bad-damages case 
is ever going to find a lawyer, because without fee-shifting, there is no 
market for his case. 
Category Three: Bad Liability/Good Damages—The bad-
liability/good-damages case is a high-risk proposition for a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer.  Often the defense will not consider settlement unless or until 
the plaintiff has survived summary judgment.  Even after summary 
judgment, the defendants may choose to go to trial because they have 
several bites left at the apple: they can win a directed verdict, a jury 
verdict at trial, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a reversal 
of the denial of summary judgment or of an adverse verdict on 
appeal.  The litigation costs will likely be very high.  Therefore, unless 
the damages are extraordinarily high, most experienced lawyers will 
avoid such cases, knowing that they can become sinkholes of costs.  
(Recall the environmental lawsuit described in A Civil Action49—a 
classic bad-liability/good-damages case that destroyed the firm and 
bankrupted the plaintiffs’ counsel.)50  In most bad-liability/good-
damages cases, the plaintiff will not be able to find a lawyer, because 
even a quick cost–benefit analysis will confirm that the lawyer cannot 
make money on the file. 
Fee-shifting also has virtually no effect in bad-liability/good-
damages cases: whether in the end a lawyer says yes or no to the case, 
the availability of statutory attorney’s fees is largely irrelevant.  The 
consenting lawyer knows that the case probably will not settle quickly 
or easily (because of the bad liability), and that if the plaintiff loses, 
the lawyer will earn nothing.  The bait that lures the rare lawyer to 
such a case is not the incentive of fee-shifting but the possibility of 
getting a percentage of a huge verdict or settlement.  It is the far-
 
 49. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Jonathan Harr & Marty Asher eds., Random 
House 1995). 
 50. It is worth noting, however, that category three (bad-liability/good-damages) cases that 
get past summary judgment might settle.  The combination of high transaction costs and high 
exposure for the defense, together with the plaintiff’s risk of non-recovery, can be a recipe for 
settlement, because both sides have reason to compromise. 
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above-market-rate payout, not reasonable attorney’s fees, that draws 
a lawyer to take this type of case—if a lawyer can be found at all.   
Category Four: Bad Liability/Bad Damages—Only a pro se 
litigant or a foolhardy lawyer files a bad-liability/bad-damages case.  
The odds of winning are too low for the plaintiff ever to prevail, and 
the damages are too low to support a pure contingent fee, even if a 
miraculous victory were to occur.  No plaintiff with a bad-
liability/bad-damages civil rights case can find a lawyer, with or 
without a fee-shifting law, because there is no market for it. 
3. Lessons from the Matrix—This simple matrix clarifies the 
obvious: without fee-shifting, tort plaintiffs typically are only able to 
find counsel if their lawsuit fits category one (and rarely category 
three) above.  Without good damages, the market for legal services is 
closed to tort plaintiffs.  They must abandon their claims or proceed in 
pro per.  The matrix illustrates that a fee-shifting statute like section 
1988 only serves as a significant inducement to lawyers in good-
liability/bad-damages cases, because only in that category does the 
plaintiff’s lawyer expect to be paid through a fee award.  Fee-shifting 
serves little or no purpose in the other three categories, because in 
each the plaintiff can already secure a lawyer through the contingent 
fee system, or the plaintiff cannot secure a lawyer at all, even with 
fee-shifting. 
Congress passed section 1988 to induce “private attorneys 
general” to represent plaintiffs whose civil rights were violated.  But 
in the good-damages cases, lawyers do not need fee-shifting laws to 
entice them to take cases because the contingent fee system already 
entices them with superb market efficiency.  Therefore the target 
population of section 1988 had to be people with meritorious claims 
who otherwise could not find a lawyer to represent them and for 
whom fee-shifting would make a difference—those whose rights had 
clearly been violated but who suffered low or modest damages.51 
This makes perfect sense.  When Congress attaches a fee-shifting 
provision to a remedy-creating law, it sends a strong message.  
Congress is saying that the rights secured by the law are important 
enough that the injured plaintiff should be compensated and the legal 
 
 51. Obviously the same argument applies with even more force to cases seeking only 
declaratory or injunctive relief.  But for fee-shifting, plaintiffs seeking equitable remedies would 
not find private counsel to represent them.  See infra Part III. 
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wrong righted, even if the dollar value of the harm is relatively low.  
Tort laws make plaintiffs shop in the market for a lawyer, where most 
meritorious but low-value cases will go unclaimed.  But laws like the 
Civil Rights Act, by virtue of their fee-shifting provisions, are to be 
enforced regardless of whether or not the market would otherwise 
enforce them. 
Fee-shifting also makes the most sense as public policy in good-
liability/bad-damages cases.  Where Congress has rejected the 
American rule and granted the prevailing plaintiff an entitlement to 
attorney’s fees from the losing defendants, the underlying cause of 
action typically involves significant legal rights or litigation between 
parties of unequal power.  Most federal fee-shifting statutes, like 
section 1988, are attached to laws that address major public issues like 
civil rights, discrimination, consumer protection, or unfair action by 
the government.52  The cases tend to be ones where we view the right 
itself as important, even if the harm—measured in terms of money 
damages—is often relatively small.  Put concretely, Congress wants 
rogue cops, or discriminating corporations, or predatory lenders, to be 
held accountable for these important civil wrongs and to be deterred 
by the threat of litigation, even in cases where the money damages are 
modest.53 
At bottom, these statutes are intended to regulate behavior.  The 
vehicle to deter the unwanted behavior is the private lawsuit: the 
defendants risk having to pay the plaintiff a judgment and his 
attorney’s fees if the defendants defend and lose.  In a good-
liability/bad-damages case, that statutory incentive can only work if 
the defendant is forced to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.  
Otherwise the damages alone are too low either to induce plaintiffs’ 
counsel to bring the case or to deter the unwanted conduct.  Without 
the risk of having to pay attorney’s fees, the defendants will either 
 
 52. By 1985, Congress had already passed more than 100 fee-shifting statutes.  See Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. 43–51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing and categorizing federal 
fee-shifting laws). 
 53. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986), the Court held that prevailing 
plaintiffs can recover their full attorney’s fees even where the fees far exceed the amount of the 
damages. “Because damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil 
rights litigation, Congress did not intend for fees in civil rights cases, unlike most private cases, 
to depend on obtaining substantial monetary relief.”  Id. at 575.  Courts routinely award full 
attorney’s fees to plaintiffs who prevail at trial even where the fees are ten-to-forty times the 
amount of the damages.  See MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID RUDOVSKY & KAREN BLUM, POLICE 
MISCONDUCT LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:2 (3d ed. 2003) (listing examples of low-
damages/high-fees awards). 
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never be sued at all, or they will view the low damages as an 
acceptable (and deductible) cost of their illegal conduct, happily 
paying for their sins. 
4. Evans Effects—Because fee-shifting attracts plaintiffs’ lawyers 
only in good-liability/bad-damages cases, the harm caused by Evans is 
more serious than would appear at first glance.  Before Evans, fee-
shifting guaranteed that a good-liability/bad-damages civil rights 
plaintiff could find a lawyer to represent him and to vindicate his 
rights.  The legal wrong would be righted as Congress intended; the 
plaintiff would be made whole and the lawyer would earn a living at 
market rates for her socially useful work.  After Evans, the 
defendants can argue persuasively (in a good-liability/bad-damages 
case) that their settlement offer is great for the plaintiff, and that the 
only obstacle to settlement is the hourly fee claimed by the plaintiff’s 
attorney.  The defendants will pay the plaintiff everything—a small 
sum—if the attorney will walk away from (or reduce) her fee.  All the 
bargaining power rests with the defendants, and the plaintiff and his 
attorney are put in a position of open conflict with each other.54 
The matrix teaches one other useful point.  Although fee-shifting 
helps civil rights plaintiffs get lawyers only in good-liability/bad-
damages cases, in the other three categories of cases Evans offers by 
the defendants will not work.  In a good-liability/good-damages case, 
the lawyer’s contingent fees will typically exceed any fees paid under 
the fee-shifting law, and therefore the defense cannot plausibly offer a 
settlement that does not include significant fees.  The fee-shifting act 
will be irrelevant, because the pattern of bargaining will mimic the 
pattern of bargaining that would occur in any good-liability/good-
damages tort case where fee-shifting is not available. 
In a bad-liability/good-damages case, the Evans offer will be 
equally irrelevant.  The rare plaintiffs’ lawyer who takes such a case 
does so not for the hourly fee, but for the chance at a big verdict or 
settlement.  As with a category-one case, as long as a third of the 
 
 54. This conflict is different from the conflict that arises in pure contingent fee cases, 
because in those cases (which almost always involve high damages) the lawyer and the client go 
into each case expecting that its value will be high enough (1) to satisfy the client’s wish to be 
made whole, and (2) to pay the lawyer a reasonable if not generous fee.  Indeed, if the lawyer 
had thought, for example, that two-thirds of the payout would not be enough to satisfy the client 
and one-third of the payout would not be enough to cover her own costs and time, she would 
not have taken the case.  And, of course, if both the lawyer and the client got it wrong, they 
share the loss. 
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settlement exceeds the value of the billable hours in the case at the 
point of the offer, the case will negotiate in the same way as a 
conventional tort case, and an Evans offer will be futile.  Of course, in 
a good-damages case, the contingent fee will normally exceed the 
total billings at the point of serious negotiation; indeed, that would be 
the very calculation that led the lawyer to accept the case in the first 
place.  Finally, in a bad-liability/bad-damages case, there will be no 
lawyer at all, and thus no Evans negotiation will occur. 
5. Summary—Two propositions result: (1) that fee-shifting only 
affects the market for plaintiffs with good-liability/bad-damages cases; 
and (2) that an Evans offer can usually be effective as a defense 
negotiation strategy only in good-liability/bad-damages cases.  What 
Evans does, then, is to reverse the rationale for fee-shifting.  It 
deprives plaintiffs of lawyers in the one category of civil rights cases 
where fee-shifting is needed to attract lawyers by guaranteeing that 
lawyers will not be able to make money on those cases.  At the same 
time, it potentially delivers extra money in the form of fee awards or 
higher fee settlements to plaintiffs and their lawyers in cases where 
the lawyers would have taken the cases even without the added 
inducement of fee-shifting.55  Evans thus inverts the logic of fee-
shifting laws and completely undermines their purpose. 
Before Evans, if state officials clearly violated a person’s 
constitutional rights, the plaintiffs’ bar would step forward to right the 
wrong, even if the damages were quite low.  Today no plaintiffs’ 
lawyer will touch such a case.56  The litigation costs are too steep.57  
The possibility of an interlocutory appeal (on the issue of qualified 
 
 55. If fees are awarded post-verdict, the plaintiff and the lawyer may both recover more in 
a case the lawyer would have taken on a contingent basis anyway.  To the extent that the 
defendants pay even a small premium in settlement for the risk of having to pay attorney’s fees, 
the settlement is higher than it would otherwise have been in a case where no inducement was 
needed to recruit the lawyer at the start. 
 56. Julie Davies’s conclusion, based on a more systematic inquiry, was much the same; 
although the lawyers she talked to did not identify Evans as the obstacle to their practice, most 
assumed that they could not make money on a good-liability/bad-damages case.  See Davies, 
supra note 34, at 199–200, 217–18. See also Nazer, supra note 34, at 537. 
 57. Before Evans, a law school clinic like mine could routinely refer good-liability/bad-
damages fee-shifting cases to the private bar.  After Evans, as the fallout from the case became 
apparent, we were unable to refer cases involving less than $100,000 in damages to the private 
bar.  Today the private bar views an ordinary tort case and a civil rights case the same.  Without 
good damages, the plaintiff will not be able to find a private lawyer to represent him (other than 
very rare pro bono publico representation). 
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immunity) only ups the ante,58 because it means that the lawyer might 
have to litigate in two courts before a settlement offer will be 
forthcoming.  Any private lawyer reviewing such a case knows at once 
that she cannot make money on it as a pure tort case.  But Evans 
means she must make the same calculation in a civil rights case: the 
damages will be far below the lawyer’s projected costs and billable 
hours, and the prospect of an Evans offer—granting full but modest 
damages in return for a waiver or reduction of fees—will be close to 
certain. 
To be blunt, Evans changed the calculation of what a case is 
worth.  Before Evans, if the damage claim was worth $10,000 and the 
attorney time was going to be, say, $40,000, then the defense thought 
of the case as a $50,000 case—that was the true measure of the 
defendants’ exposure.  Settlement proceeded accordingly, perhaps 
with the damage figure discounted for the risk of a “no cause” or a 
low verdict at trial.  But it was hard for defense counsel in 
negotiations to discount the attorney’s fees to the same extent that 
they discounted the claim on the merits, because even if the plaintiff 
won only $7,000 instead of $10,000 at trial, the plaintiff’s lawyer would 
still be entitled to the same $40,000 in fees.59  The only way to curtail 
the attorney’s fees was to settle early, before the plaintiff’s side had 
expended many billable hours. 
Before Evans, the fee-shifting statute therefore had its intended 
effect even in negotiation.  Defense counsel had to think of the merits 
claim and the fee claim in different terms, and had to discount them 
differently.  The defense also had a powerful incentive to settle early, 
before the plaintiff’s fees mounted.  After Evans, defense lawyers 
stopped thinking about the value of the fee claim, because the defense 
could always cut the plaintiff’s lawyer out with a good settlement 
offer conditioned on the waiver of fees.  In a post-Evans world, a 
$10,000 claim with a seventy percent chance of success and $40,000 in 
attorney’s fees yields an offer much closer to $7,000 than to $47,000, 
because defense counsel no longer has to think of the attorney’s fees 
as a realistic exposure.  The defense also has no incentive to settle 
early.  To the contrary, the defense incentive after Evans is to stall 
 
 58. In a civil rights case, defendants are permitted to file an interlocutory appeal on the 
issue of qualified immunity.  See Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).  Such an appeal 
can add 18 months and tens of thousands of dollars to the lawyer’s litigation costs. 
 59. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (holding that attorney’s fees 
need not be proportional to the amount of damages). 
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settlement, because the higher the plaintiff’s billable hours, the more 
leverage the defense has, as the plaintiff’s lawyer becomes desperate to 
stem the bleeding.60 
In sum, Evans allowed defense counsel to treat civil rights cases 
the same as other tort cases.  And once the mind-set of defense 
counsel changed, the mind-set of plaintiffs’ lawyers changed as well.  
They internalized the defense message, gradually learning that 
without high damages they were wasting their time.  The defense 
would always offer a settlement the plaintiff could not refuse, but that 
would leave the lawyer with little or nothing to show for her work.  
Congress’s efforts to improve the market for legal services for civil 
rights plaintiffs was undone by Evans, because it put civil rights cases 
on the same footing as conventional tort cases, in which fee-shifting 
was not available.  Justice Brennan was right: even private plaintiffs’ 
lawyers with high ideals have to earn a living, and therefore the long-
term effect of Evans should have been “embarrassingly obvious,”61 
despite the majority’s protestations.62 
II.  EFFORTS TO CONTRACT AROUND EVANS 
In the years after Evans, the Legal Services community spent 
considerable conference time—and spilled a fair amount of ink—
trying to come up with an Evans-proof retainer agreement.  The 
problem was caused not by Evans alone but by the perceived tension 
between Evans and the ethics rules.63  Rule 1.7(b) of the Model Rules 
 
 60. Moreover, if the defendants are represented by salaried lawyers from the state attorney 
general’s office, the incentive to stall settlement is even stronger.  The plaintiff’s costs will keep 
rising with little prospect of ever being paid, while the defense costs stay flat—really at zero—
because the defense lawyers will be paid their salary by the state whether they settle the case or 
not. 
 61. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 759 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 62. Other commentators have noted that the real harm from fee waivers is not to the 
plaintiff in the case in which the fee waiver is offered, but to the 
truly unrepresented class, who are unable to obtain legal representation to bring civil 
rights claims in the future.  The harm is to the general public as well, which suffers not 
only from lax enforcement of the civil rights laws, but also from the diminishing of the 
deterrent impact of attorney’s fees by the perception that the costs of noncompliance 
has been freed from the burden of [paying attorney’s fees]. 
Kraus, supra note 30, at 625.  See also Margaret Annabel de Lisser, Note, Giving Substance to 
the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v. Jeff D.: A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553, 568 n.89 (1987). 
 63. See, e.g., Peter H. Woodin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State 
Ethics Prohibitions After Evans v. Jeff D., 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1230 (1987) (arguing that 
even after Evans state ethics boards should have prohibited fee waiver demands, based solely 
on the ethics rules). 
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of Professional Conduct says: “A lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client may be materially limited . . . by the 
lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely affected, and (2) the client 
consents after consultation.”64  Additionally, Rule 1.2(a) of the Model 
Rules clarifies that the client, and the client alone, has the authority to 
settle a case: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to 
accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”65 
Accordingly, when defense lawyers made an Evans offer (giving 
the plaintiff nearly everything on the condition that he waive or 
reduce his statutory attorney’s fees), the plaintiff’s lawyer could 
recommend that her client decline the offer, but the lawyer could not 
veto the client’s decision to accept it.66  Most lawyers and 
commentators agreed that a retainer agreement could not overtly 
take away the client’s right to accept a settlement—and give that right 
to the lawyer—without violating Rule 1.2 or creating an impossible 
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7.67  Creative plaintiffs’ lawyers 
therefore floated several ideas to protect themselves or their public 
interest law offices from Evans offers. 
 
 64. I will refer only to the Model Rules, because, since their adoption by the ABA in 1983, 
they have largely supplanted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that preceded 
them.  As of 2007, nearly all fifty states had replaced ethics codes based on the Model Code with 
ethics codes based on the Model Rules, and the few exceptions had modified their codes to 
reflect Model Rules provisions.  See JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 319 (abridged ed., 2006–2007). 
 65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002). 
 66. One can argue that public interest plaintiffs’ lawyers cannot even recommend against 
acceptance of such a settlement without creating a conflict of interest.  (The Idaho Legal Aid 
Society lawyer in Evans itself was a forceful and eloquent advocate for this position.)  Others 
have disagreed, arguing that public interest plaintiffs’ lawyers should not be in any worse 
position than other plaintiffs’ lawyers, and of course private tort lawyers routinely recommend 
that their clients reject settlements when the lawyers think they can make more money from the 
case by taking it to trial.  See Nazer, supra note 34, at 520–21; Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial 
Ethics of the N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Eth. Op. 1987-4, 5 (1987) (reversing the previous bar on fee 
waivers in light of Evans, but with a strong minority report arguing that public interest plaintiffs’ 
lawyers should not be held to a different ethical standard than private plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 67. Compare Goldstein, supra note 35, at 291–95 (arguing for coercive retainer agreements 
and downplaying their ethical problems) with Nazer, supra note 34, at 519 (noting that in the 
1990s bar ethics opinions from Connecticut, North Dakota, Utah, and the District of Columbia 
prohibited retainer contracts that limited a client’s ability to accept a settlement offer, including 
a condition that an offer must be rejected if it does not include reasonable fees or preserve the 
right to seek reasonable fees).  California, on the other hand, approved such a retainer contract.  
See State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1994-
136 (1994). 
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A. The Goldstein Proposal 
In 1986, Steven M. Goldstein proposed a fee contract for LSC 
lawyers that prohibited the simultaneous negotiation of the merits 
and the fees of a case and that required judicial review of any 
settlement that paid less than a reasonable fee.68  The problem with 
Goldstein’s proposal was that it could not bind the defense attorneys 
who would be making the Evans offer, nor could it bind the court to 
review such a settlement.69 
Moreover, Goldstein’s proposal did not solve the Evans problem 
because his retainer agreement was unenforceable in practice.70  If the 
plaintiff accepted the Evans offer and deprived the lawyer of her 
reasonable fee despite having promised not to do so, the plaintiff’s 
lawyer had little recourse.  The lawyer could withdraw from the case,71 
but withdrawing would not get her the money she was owed (and that 
she had expected to be paid by the defendants pursuant to the fee-
shifting law when she agreed to represent the plaintiff).72 
The plaintiff’s lawyer would be left with a contract claim against 
her own client.  Even if she sued, she could recover only whatever 
remained of the client’s small settlement—an amount that by 
definition (in a good-liability/bad-damages case) would be less than 
what the lawyer had spent on the case.  The lawyer would have the 
time and expense of a second lawsuit on her hands, against her own 
uncollectible client.  She would have the moral high ground but a 
boatload of misery. 
 
 68. See Steven M. Goldstein, Settlement Offers Contingent Upon Waiver of Attorney Fees: 
A Continuing Dilemma after Evans v. Jeff D., 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 692, 699–701 (Oct. 
1986). 
 69. The fact that the plaintiff and his lawyer agreed to negotiate the issues separately, or 
agreed to get the court’s approval after the fact if the lawyer were underpaid, could not control 
or even influence the defense bar’s conduct or the court’s actions. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Under MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2002), attorneys can only 
withdraw in certain situations.  Disagreement about settlement may not be enough to get out of 
a case, even if the settlement results in the lawyer being paid less than she had hoped to be paid.  
And once a case is filed, the lawyer may also need the judge’s permission to withdraw, which is 
not always or easily forthcoming.  Id. 
 72. The judge hearing the underlying case would be unlikely to referee a contract dispute 
between the lawyer and her client.  And if the lawyer tried to sue for specific performance 
before the case was over, she would create a conflict that would require her to withdraw.  She 
cannot both represent the client and be the plaintiff in a collection action against the client at 
the same time.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.9 (2007). 
01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:32:30 AM 
24 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 3:1 
B. The Yelenosky and Silver Proposal 
In 1994, Stephen Yelenosky and Charles Silver took another crack 
at the Evans problem.73  Their retainer agreement made the plaintiff 
liable for the lawyer’s reasonable hourly fees in full, but the lawyer 
agreed not to collect the debt.  Instead the plaintiff assigned the fee 
claim to his lawyer, so that the lawyer could use the assigned claim to 
deal with the defendants.74  The client got a debt but no personal 
liability; the lawyer got the fee claim but assumed the risk of loss if it 
bore no fruit. 
The Yelenosky and Silver retainer treated all settlement payments 
as received for the benefit of the client and the lawyer, to be 
distributed between them pursuant to an allocation formula.75  The 
interests of the client and the lawyer were thus joined regardless of 
how the defense characterized the split between damages and fees in 
their settlement offer. 
The sticky part of Yelenosky and Silver’s proposal was the 
formula itself, which sought to yield a fair division of the funds by 
linking it to the value of the damages versus the value of the fees at 
the point when the offer was made.76  They came up with a formula 
that had the virtues of being easy to calculate, consistent, and fair, but 
its vice was that it was extraordinarily hard to explain to a client—
especially to an uneducated or unsophisticated client.77 
 
 73. See Stephen Yelenosky & Charles Silver, A Model Retainer Agreement for Legal 
Services Programs: Mandatory Attorney Fee Provisions, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 114 (June 
1994).  LSC had promulgated a model retainer agreement pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 1611.8(a) 
(1993), which required LSC offices and their clients to sign a written retainer agreement.  
Yelenosky and Silver were critical of the fee provisions of the new model agreement and wrote 
to offer what they thought was a better alternative.  The LSC model agreement drew in part on 
an agreement proposed for private civil rights lawyers.  Id.  See Jeff Scott Olson, A New Model 
Retainer Agreement for Civil Rights Cases: Nailing Things Down on Settled Ground, in 7 CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 391, 391–415 (Steven 
Saltzman & Barbara M. Wolvovitz eds., 1991); discussion infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 74. Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 118, 135–36. 
 75. Id. at 119–123, 131–32, 135–37. 
 76. See Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 119–20, 131–32.  As they put it, 
Because plaintiff’s right to a fee award increases defendant’s expected loss at trial, it 
increases the amount a defendant will find it economically rational to pay in 
settlement of the claim. . . .  The size of the settlement is thus attributable partly to a 
client’s entitlement to compensatory relief and partly to a client’s entitlement to a fee 
award.  The difficulty is in determining the portion of the payment . . . in a particular 
case that is attributable to [one or the other]. 
Id. at 120. 
 77. The formula read like an algebra textbook and would have been impenetrable to most 
LSC clients.  See id. at 131–32. 
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In addition, the client would never get less than the predicted 
verdict—the amount the lawyer would expect the client to win at trial, 
discounted by the odds of winning.  That was the client’s floor.  The 
floor was needed because federal regulations barred LSC offices from 
charging a fee at all unless the client was first fully compensated.78 
The floor may have been required by federal law, but that 
exception gave skilled defense counsel all the opening needed to 
force an Evans settlement.  If defense counsel could assess that 
number and offer it, the client should accept the offer, effectively 
cutting the lawyer out of any fee.79  Accordingly, the Yelenosky and 
Silver contract could not prevent or counteract Evans offers in most 
cases, because federal regulations required the client to be fully 
compensated before the lawyer could exact her fee.80 
Moreover, even without the LSC requirement of a “full 
compensation” floor, the Yelenosky and Silver proposal did little to 
ward off Evans offers in cases where a defense to the Evans offer was 
most necessary—cases where the lawyers’ fees were high but the 
client’s damages were low.  In that situation, once the split favored the 
lawyer, there would be little incentive for the client to reject an early 
low offer, because over time the lawyer’s share would only increase 
(as the lawyer put more time into the case), while the client’s share 
would remain fixed by the static nature of his damages.  With the 
formula’s constant numerator and escalating denominator, the 
plaintiff would need a much higher offer down the road to improve 
 
 78. At the time, Legal Services Offices labored under a constraint imposed by federal law 
that programs could not charge clients for their services and could retain moneys as fees only 
when the fees would not reduce the amount of damages or other relief awarded to the client.  
Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 120 n.20 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609.5, 1609.6 (1993); 
interpretive letters from the LSC General Counsel’s Office). 
 79. For example, if the predicted verdict was $10,000 with a fifty percent chance of winning, 
the defense would only have to offer $5,000.  The client would have no reason not to take it, and 
the lawyer would get nothing. 
 80. Another weakness of the proposal was that it required the lawyer to set two different 
variables in the formula: (1) the predicted verdict, expressed as a dollar figure; and (2) the odds 
of winning, expressed as a percentage.  Both variables could have a huge effect on the resulting 
fees versus damages calculation.  As the authors acknowledged, neither variable could be set 
with any accuracy at the start of the case, but late in the case the lawyer would have a powerful 
self-interest in setting the variables to her own advantage.  The formula thus created a risk that 
the calculation of the split would be slanted against the client and in favor of the lawyer.  In the 
end Yelenosky and Silver conceded that the client would have to rely on the good faith of the 
lawyer, as is true in most lawyer-client dealings.  Given that Legal Aid lawyers are a self-
selecting altruistic lot, and that any attorney’s fees go to the program and not to the individual 
lawyer, Yelenosky and Silver thought the risk of a skewed formula was acceptably low.  
Yelenosky & Silver, supra note 73, at 126–27. 
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his position.  The defense would thus still be able to get out of the case 
cheaply and mostly to the detriment of the plaintiff’s counsel. 
The Yelenosky and Silver retainer agreement was little tested for 
two reasons.  First, it was so complicated that few LSC lawyers were 
willing to subject their clients to it.  Second, as noted above, by 1996 
LSC-funded offices were barred from handling fee-generating cases 
entirely.81  As a result, the problem of how to counteract the effect of 
Evans reverted to the private plaintiffs’ bar, which until Evans had 
routinely and enthusiastically accepted good-liability/bad-damages 
cases under section 1983. 
C. The Olson Proposal 
Yelenosky and Silver had based their contract in part on a model 
retainer agreement drafted by a private civil rights lawyer in 
Wisconsin, Jeff Scott Olson.82  Like Yelenosky and Silver’s contract, 
Olson’s model agreement treated any money received as a lump sum 
for the benefit of the client and the lawyer.83  But the Olson contract 
also contained several other provisions designed to prevent defense 
counsel from being able to make effective Evans offers.  First, it 
assigned the fee claim to the lawyer so that the lawyer could pursue 
collection on her own behalf if necessary.  Second, it gave the 
plaintiff’s lawyer a lien on any funds received, to guarantee that the 
lawyer would be able to deduct her fee from the settlement.84  Third, it 
gave the lawyer the right to withdraw from the case if the client made 
a “fiscally unreasonable decision” with regard to settlement, while 
protecting the lawyer’s right to be paid by the client for all work done 
up to the point of withdrawal.85  Finally, the contract’s hourly rate 
included a steep contingency enhancement.86 
 
 81. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Jeff Scott Olson, Protection, Persuasion and Proof: Toward a Model Civil Rights 
Retainer Agreement for the 90s, in 3 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL 
HANDBOOK 371, 371–81 (Clark Boardman, Co. 1987).  Olsen later modified his model 
agreement to streamline it and to resolve some of the peripheral issues that had not been 
addressed in the first draft.  See Olson, supra note 73. 
 83. Olson credits the idea of “lumping” the damages and the attorney’s fees to an ethics 
opinion that was issued after Evans came down.  Olson, supra note 73, at 399–400 (citing New 
Mexico Bar Association Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1985-3 (1985)). 
 84. Id. at 401–02, 408. 
 85. Id. at 405. 
 86. The contingency enhancement was included to account for the risk, over a series of 
these cases, that more often than not the lawyer would be underpaid for her services, so that the 
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Olson’s contract, unlike Yelenosky and Silver’s, did not have a 
floor that guaranteed the client any level of recovery, because none 
was compelled.87  Thus, under Olson’s agreement, the lawyer’s fee 
could consume the entire settlement fund.  Indeed, in good-
liability/bad-damages cases, the lawyer’s fee would nearly always do 
just that.  The client’s only recourse would be to refuse to settle, thus 
forcing the lawyer either to renegotiate the split or to take the case to 
trial against the lawyer’s wishes.88 
Olson understood that in a post-Evans world, what the plaintiffs’ 
bar needed was not a remedial hammer for the client’s breach of the 
retainer agreement, but a built-in financial “lock” that would preclude 
the client from accepting an Evans offer in the first place.  The Olson 
contract averted Evans offers by the simple expedient of making the 
client liable for the full amount of the attorney’s fees if the client tried 
to cut the lawyer out.89  At bottom, the Olson contract created an 
overwhelming economic incentive for the client always to do what his 
lawyer wanted him to do.  The client had no choice but to reject any 
offer that did not pay the lawyer a reasonable fee for the time she had 
invested in the case. 
The Olson scheme had obvious objections.  First, the fee contract 
itself undermined the purpose of fee-shifting laws.90  The purpose of 
such laws is not just to find lawyers for plaintiffs with modest damages 
(or to deter unwanted conduct), but also to make injured plaintiffs 
whole.  A scheme that benefits plaintiffs’ lawyers at the expense of 
their clients undercuts that goal.91  Second, plaintiffs’ lawyers might 
justifiably fear that the Olson contract violated state ethics rules on 
unreasonable fees.  In looking at the reasonableness of a fee, a bar 
 
“normal market rate” was not a true measure of the lawyer’s costs over time.  Id. at 397–98, 407, 
413. 
 87. See id. at 400–01. 
 88. One could argue that the real point of the Olson contract was to force plaintiffs to go to 
trial in all good-liability/bad-damages cases, so that their lawyers would get paid by full-fee 
awards post-verdict, and not via settlement.  But few private plaintiffs’ counsel have the energy 
or resources to keep a practice alive in which every case must go to trial in order for the lawyer 
to be paid.  The result would be no different than under the Evans regime: plaintiffs’ lawyers 
would soon shun the good-liability/bad-damages cases. 
 89. See Olson, supra note 73, at 401, 407–08. 
 90. This objection was flagged by Goldstein, supra note 68, at 694 n.8. 
 91. No doubt Olson believed that the choice after Evans was either no lawyers to represent 
civil rights plaintiffs (in good-liability/bad-damages cases) or lawyers who could coerce their 
clients into rejecting settlements that would deprive the lawyers of reasonable fees.  For Olson, 
the fault lay with the Court’s decision in Evans and what logically flowed from it, not with the 
plaintiffs’ bar. 
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grievance commission typically does not make its determination in a 
vacuum, based only on the time and effort the lawyer has expended.92  
Rather, it makes its determination in context, including the amount 
recovered by the plaintiff, or other measures of the success of the 
litigation.  If the fee contract is structured so that, in good-
liability/bad-damages cases, the client is certain to come away with 
very little, and the lawyer is certain to come away with a lot, the 
lawyer might reasonably fear disciplinary action for charging 
excessive fees.93 
D. Reading the Market 
One might think that the Olson contract—with its one-sided 
protections for plaintiffs’ counsel—would have resolved the Evans 
problem and kept private plaintiffs’ lawyers as eager to litigate good-
liability/bad-damages cases after Evans as they had been before.  But 
that did not happen. 
The plaintiffs’ bar’s lack of faith in—or distaste for—an Evans-
proof retainer is best borne out by the market response to Evans.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers did not keep taking good-liability/bad-damages 
cases assuming that they could contract their way around the Evans 
problem.94  To the contrary, they stopped taking the cases because 
they had no choice.  A straight contingent fee was out of the question.  
If plaintiffs’ lawyers used the Yelenosky and Silver contract, they 
would still get burned because smart defendants would offer, and 
smart plaintiffs would accept, early low settlements, and the lawyers 
would be cut out or underpaid.  And if plaintiffs’ lawyers went with an 
Olson-style contract, they would wind up with most or all of the 
 
 92. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2006).  This is true even in the 
context of criminal cases, where there is no possibility of monetary recovery.  See, e.g., In re 
Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1979); In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996). 
 93. The Olson model fee contract increased the risk of a Rule 1.2(a) violation because it 
included a “springing” contingency fee; at the end of the case the lawyer could elect either the 
agreed-upon hourly rate or a contingent fee, whichever was higher.  That way the lawyer would 
be sure to get a share of any jackpot if the case produced an unexpectedly high verdict or 
settlement.  See also Philadelphia Bar Assoc’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2001-1 (2002) 
(holding that a contract that punishes a client financially for settling when the lawyer wishes not 
to settle or for not settling when the lawyer wishes to settle usurps the client’s exclusive right to 
make the decision on settlement). 
 94. As Justice Brennan noted in Evans, “Of course, none of the parties has seriously 
suggested that civil rights attorneys can protect themselves through private arrangements.  After 
all, Congress enacted the Fees Act because, after Alyeska, it found such arrangements wholly 
inadequate.”  Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 757 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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settlement money, but with very unhappy clients; or they would have 
to try every case.  They might also face ethics charges, because in any 
good-liability/bad-damages cases that settled, the lawyers should have 
known at the start that they would get nearly everything and that the 
clients would get almost nothing. 
The dried-up market strongly suggests that contract-cures for the 
Evans problem were unreliable or unsavory enough that few lawyers 
wanted to use them.95  The result was that section 1988 became a dead 
letter for the one category of cases it was intended to induce private 
lawyers to take—good-liability/bad-damages cases.  In the years after 
Evans, apart from the rare pro bono case, private lawyers simply 
stopped handling good-liability/bad-damages cases. 
The only lawyers left who could afford to handle such cases were 
salaried lawyers who did not have to rely on attorney’s fees for their 
livelihood.  But lawyers who work for public interest law offices with 
independent funding normally do not handle individual civil rights 
actions, because the agencies they work for focus on larger social or 
political issues.96  Their legal work typically takes the form of class 
actions challenging unconstitutional state laws or policies in cases 
seeking equitable relief. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Many good-liability/bad-damages cases are, like Evans itself, not 
damages cases at all.  Rather, the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the 
form of a change of governmental policy.97  In these cases, the state 
defendants have great leverage.  As in Evans, they can offer broad 
and flexible relief in return for a waiver or reduction of attorney’s 
fees.98 
 
 95. The issue disappeared from the LSC literature after 1996, when LSC field offices were 
prohibited from seeking attorney’s fees.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 96. To the extent that non-profit legal service providers handle individual civil rights 
damages claims, the dynamics of settlement under Evans are the same as described above.  The 
difference is that a non-profit law office can much more easily agree to a reduced fee because 
the lawyers do not need the fees to put food on the table.  If the health of the agency is 
jeopardized by a lack of funding, however, then one would expect to see the same thing seen in 
the private sector: movement away from cases with low or modest damages.  See, e.g., Nazer, 
supra note 34, at 535–38. 
 97. In the following sections, I will refer to the plaintiffs in the plural, because in most 
injunctive-relief cases the plaintiffs are a class or the caption includes several individual named 
plaintiffs. 
 98. Often the costs to the state can be absorbed in ways that are difficult to measure in a 
vast state budget but that require little immediate outlay of hard dollars. 
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The bulk of such injunctive civil rights work was always done by 
salaried lawyers, typically at publicly funded Legal Aid offices or at 
membership-funded organizations like the ACLU or the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund.99  Before Evans, however, many private, for-
profit plaintiffs’ firms took these cases as well; in fact some firms 
specialized in them.  The cases could generate lots of billable hours 
because, like Evans, they tended to be complex and long-lived.  
Private plaintiffs’ lawyers could thus afford to do the work, knowing 
that if they won or settled they would be paid for all their hours at 
prevailing market rates.  The financial reward could be very high, in 
addition to the moral reward of forcing the government to obey the 
law. 
Evans drove these firms out of the civil rights legal market, too.  
The specialty firms could no longer serve as “private attorneys 
general” to bring injunctive-relief cases, because, like the LSC lawyers 
in Evans, in the end they would not be paid for their time and effort.  
Evans thus destroyed the private bar’s important supplementary role 
in these cases.  In sum, while Evans did not completely drain the pool 
of available lawyers handling injunctive civil rights cases (as it did 
with low-damages civil rights actions), it greatly reduced the pool by 
siphoning off the private bar. 
The harm, though less pronounced, was still very real.  LSC had 
offices in all fifty states.  But with LSC lawyers barred from handling 
class actions after 1996,100 and with private firms out of the civil rights 
business, plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief were left only with non-
profit legal agencies.  But such agencies are not easy to find.  Many 
states, especially rural states, have few or none.  Therefore, unless the 
plaintiffs are in a big city, and unless they can find an agency that 
specializes in their type of claim, no lawyer will be available.  For 
purposes of challenging unconstitutional state action, the result is 
what economists would call a “distribution failure.” 
 
 99. The legal arms of these agencies, together with their sponsoring organizations, can 
assert considerable influence over state law and policy, both through their lobbying efforts and 
through litigation.  For example, the ACLU in California has challenged a host of state laws, 
policies, and referenda having to do with schools, medical care, welfare, prisons, etc. 
 100. LSC lawyers could still bring civil rights cases seeking injunctive relief on behalf of an 
individual client.  But such cases are more susceptible to dismissal on grounds of mootness.  The 
defendants can offer relief to the individual plaintiff without changing the underlying policy.  
Also, because LSC lawyers are banned from receiving attorney’s fees, there is no added 
financial risk to the defendants of taking the case to trial or delaying settlement as long as 
possible. 
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In contrast, the “private attorneys general” who were drawn to 
civil rights cases by the Fees Act were not geographically limited—
they were everywhere.  Until Evans, the Fees Act created the same 
useful incentive wherever lawyers practiced law and wherever states 
infringed upon the constitutional rights of their residents.  Evans thus 
not only dried up the legal market for civil rights plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims but low damages; it also gutted the corps of 
“private attorneys general” who had served as a useful check on 
unconstitutional state laws and policies.101 
IV.  TROUBLE SINCE EVANS 
A. The Buckhannon Problem 
Since Evans, things have gotten worse for the private plaintiffs’ 
bar.  Under section 1988, to be eligible for a fee award plaintiffs must 
be “prevailing parties.”102  Until 2001, the “catalyst theory” of fee-
shifting held that plaintiffs were eligible for attorney’s fees if their 
lawsuit provoked the change they sought in their complaint.  That is, 
defendants could not avoid liability for fees by capitulating at the last 
minute.  The courts deemed the plaintiffs to be prevailing parties 
regardless of whether their lawsuit was resolved by a judgment, by a 
settlement, or even by the unilateral action of the defendants.103  The 
catalyst theory had been endorsed by every federal court of appeals 
 
 101. The private attorneys general model had also created within the private bar centers of 
expertise and networks of collaboration that would not otherwise have existed.  Evans 
destroyed these resources, too, when it drove private lawyers out of the civil rights business. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2007). 
 103. See, e.g., Paris v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st Cir. 
1993); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274–76 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski 
County Special Dist. No. 1, 17 F.3d 260, 262–63 (8th Cir. 1994); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 
751–53 (9th Cir. 1995).  At one point, twelve of the thirteen circuits to have considered the issue 
had adopted the catalyst theory.  See Deford, supra note 3, at 313 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & 
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 626 n.4 (2001) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).  Most of the cases relied on dicta from Hewitt v. Helms, in which 
Justice Scalia wrote: 
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order to justify 
a fee award under § 1988.  A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the 
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a 
judgment—e.g., a monetary settlement or a change in conduct that redresses the 
plaintiff’s grievances.  When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed 
despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor. 
482 U.S. 755, 760–61 (1987).  Hewitt was the logical extension of Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 
129 (1980), which rejected defense arguments that to be a “prevailing party” a plaintiff must go 
to trial. 
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to have considered the issue except the Fourth Circuit, which had 
disapproved it en banc by a single vote.104  In Buckhannon Board and 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human 
Resources,105 however, the Supreme Court renounced the catalyst 
theory.  It said that to be a prevailing party eligible for a fee award 
under a fee-shifting statute, a plaintiff had to win a contested 
judgment, a consent judgment, or a settlement subject to some 
ongoing court supervision or judicial approval.106  After Buckhannon, 
simply provoking the defendants to change their position—even as a 
direct result of the litigation—no longer entitled plaintiffs to 
prevailing party status under federal law.107 
Many catalyst theory cases involved a demand for policy changes 
or other injunctive relief beyond the direct control of the named 
defendants.  Buckhannon itself was typical.  The plaintiffs complained 
that a state administrative rule violated due process as applied to 
them.  While the case was pending, the state legislature quietly 
amended the rule, deleting the offending section.108  The change 
effectively mooted the case, since the plaintiffs got all the relief sought 
in their lawsuit.  The Court held that they were ineligible for any 
attorney’s fees, for lack of a judgment or comparable judicial relief.109 
Buckhannon created one more defense to the payment of 
attorney’s fees to successful plaintiffs,110 and it reduced the 
defendants’ risk that they would have to pay fees, whether they caved 
in to the plaintiffs’ demands or orchestrated the change of policy 
outside of the settlement process.  In Buckhannon, as in Evans, the 
 
 104. See S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51–52 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876 (1994). 
 105. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 106. Id. at 600–10. 
 107. In practice the catalyst theory had provided a safety net for plaintiffs’ lawyers who 
might otherwise have been deprived of their fees.  That is, until Buckhannon, if the favorable 
change occurred outside the settlement process, the plaintiffs could still file a fee petition, and 
under the catalyst theory they had a good shot at being awarded fees by the court. 
 108. Presumably the named defendants lacked the power to make the change themselves, 
else—one must assume—they would have negotiated the change, conditioning it on the waiver 
of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, à la Evans. 
 109. Id. at 600–06. 
 110. The added harm caused by Buckhannon is hard to measure.  It may have been modest, 
given that by 2001 so few private lawyers were handling injunctive civil rights actions anyway, 
other than on a pro bono basis.  Also, if both sides want to settle, even after Buckhannon it is 
possible to sign an agreement that includes attorney’s fees, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
class could attain “prevailing party” status for lack of a judgment or its equivalent.  See Deford, 
supra note 3, at 322. 
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plaintiffs won everything they wanted, while their lawyers gained 
nothing for their work, which included an appeal all the way to the 
Supreme Court.111 
Buckhannon creates perverse incentives of its own.  It encourages 
plaintiffs to rush to summary judgment as quickly as possible, before 
the defendants can change their illegal conduct or policies sufficient 
to moot the case.  And it encourages defendants to act in bad faith, 
litigating with vigor until the court signals in some way that they are 
likely to lose and then capitulating quickly and completely so as to 
avoid a fee award.  Like Evans, it rewards defendants who postpone 
settlement negotiations until the plaintiffs’ attorneys have run up 
their hours (at least in cases where judicial oversight is unnecessary 
for the plaintiffs to get the relief they seek).  Buckhannon also 
encourages the defense to make Evans offers in the form of contracts 
rather than orders or consent decrees, to avoid court supervision of 
settlements that in the past would have been subject to judicial 
monitoring. 
As a result, the parties, the courts, and the public have lost: (1) the 
careful, deliberate, and thorough litigation of constitutional issues; (2) 
negotiated settlements designed to solve present and future problems; 
(3) early settlements that reduce dockets; (4) court supervision of 
settlements in some cases where supervision would be appropriate; 
and (5) “private attorneys general” willing to accept civil rights 
cases.112  At bottom, Buckhannon provides one more reason for 
private plaintiffs’ lawyers to turn down civil rights cases, further 
undermining section 1983 as a remedy for plaintiffs seeking equitable 
relief.113 
 
 111. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the case would “impede access to the court for 
the less well heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal 
law by private attorneys general.”  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  She 
wrote that “Congress enacted § 1988 to ensure that nonaffluent plaintiffs would have ‘effective 
access’ to the Nation’s courts to enforce civil rights laws.”  Id. at 636.  The plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
Buckhannon lost some $200,000 in billable hours in the case, despite having succeeded in getting 
the regulation withdrawn. 
 112. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees to 
Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 607 (1989/1990) 
(noting that civil rights lawyers “rarely, if ever . . . recover a fully compensatory fee.  As a result, 
those who formerly specialized in civil rights law are now abandoning the practice in droves” 
and citing cases documenting the difficulty of finding lawyers in civil rights cases).  Id. at 538, 
539 n.9. 
 113. After Buckhannon was decided, there were high expectations that Congress would 
swiftly overturn it through amended legislation.  This had occurred twice in the previous decade, 
when the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1020–21 (1984), that 
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B. Limitations on Fee Waivers by Defendants 
Evans left open the question whether a demand for a fee waiver 
might ever be forbidden.  On this point, the Court’s discussion was 
brief.  Justice Stevens noted that a district court need not “place its 
stamp of approval on every settlement in which the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have agreed to a fee waiver.”114  In other words, when and if 
defense counsel exceed the limit on their conduct, the district court 
can always police them.  But how are the defendants, the plaintiffs, or 
the courts to know when such a limit has been reached? 
In Evans the Court suggested three examples, treating them not as 
ethical constraints but as conduct that could undermine the purposes 
of the Fees Act and therefore might justify action by a district court.  
The Court said first that a settlement offer conditioned on the waiver 
of attorney’s fees might be inappropriate if the defendants “had no 
realistic defense on the merits.”115  But this scenario makes little sense: 
if the defendants truly had no realistic defense, any Evans offer would 
be ineffective.  The plaintiffs would reject it out of hand.  They would 
simply file a motion for summary judgment, win, and collect 
attorney’s fees as awarded by the court.116  Indeed, in no published 
case from 1986 to today has a court thrown out an Evans offer on the 
 
attorney’s fees were not recoverable under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1400–1400(d)(4), which Congress overturned in the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1986), and after West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 
U.S. 83 (1991), which barred the recovery of expert witness fees, and which Congress 
overturned by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1991).  Some 
state bar associations even went so far as to pass resolutions urging Congress to overturn 
Buckhannon.  See, e.g., Marilyn A. Mahursky, Joseph A. Reinert & O. Whitman Smith, Erosion 
of Civil Rights Enforcement: Judicial Constriction of the Civil Rights and Disability Law Bar, 28 
VT. B. J. & L. DIG. 41, 42 (June 2002).  But the pessimists of the plaintiffs’ bar turned out to be 
right, as Congress has not acted.  See Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, 
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res.: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . 
. . and the Attorney’s Fees, 36 AKRON L. REV. 363, 408 n.230 (2003) (citing Marcia Coyle, Fee 
Change is a Sea-Change But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices’ Limitation on Catalyst Theory 
Fees, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A1 (reporting skepticism among civil rights lawyers that 
Congress would act to overturn the case)). 
 114. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 739 (1986). 
 115. Id. at 740. 
 116. This example also does not square with the majority’s logic.  If attorney’s fees are just 
another commodity that can be traded to get a better deal or to promote settlement, then it is 
not clear why the relative strength of the defendants’ legal position should matter.  The weaker 
the case, the more likely the defense lawyers are to negotiate, so why take away the defendants’ 
best bargaining chip (the fee waiver) in cases where they are most handicapped by a thin 
defense? 
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grounds that the defendants’ legal position was so weak that the offer 
undermined the policies of the Fees Act. 
The Court also offered two other examples that addressed the 
dissent’s concerns.  A fee waiver might be impermissible (1) if the 
demand were part of a “systematic practice” by the state never to pay 
fees; or (2) if the demand were a “vindictive effort . . . to teach 
[plaintiffs’] counsel that they had better not bring such cases.”117  In 
Evans, neither example had legs because the Court was persuaded 
that: 
[T]he record in this case does not indicate that Idaho has adopted 
such a [systematic] . . . policy, or practice.  Nor does the record 
support the narrower proposition that [the state’s] request to 
waive fees was a vindictive effort to deter attorneys from 
representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits against Idaho . . . , [or to 
implement] a routine state policy designed to frustrate the 
objectives of the Fees Act.118 
In dissent, Justice Brennan did not buy the proposition that 
judicial enforcement would occur in these situations.  (It turns out he 
was more prescient on this issue as well.)  He foresaw that once fee 
waivers had the approval of the Court, they would become de rigueur 
in any practice where they would be effective.119  Brennan understood 
that plaintiffs would be hard-pressed to challenge them, given the 
rationale for the Evans opinion.120  In fact, after Evans, the state bar 
ethics boards that had previously barred fee waivers or simultaneous 
negotiation of merits and fees immediately changed their opinions to 
permit such bargaining.121  Once Evans offers had the approval of the 
 
 117. Evans, 475 U.S. at 739–40 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Evans, 475 U.S. 
717 (No. 84-1288)).  It is hard to see what other message an Evans offer could possibly send, 
absent some special circumstance unique to the case.  An argument over the amount of the fees 
might plausibly be connected to the terms of the negotiation, but a demand for a total fee 
waiver can have only one effect on lawyers bringing civil rights cases: to drive them away.  The 
Court was unclear as to whether it was concerned with the illicit motive of the defendants, or 
with the effects of the practice of conditioning settlement on the waiver of fees. 
 118. Id. at 740. 
 119. Id. at 757–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 120. If attorney’s fees are just one of an “arsenal of remedies” that can be freely negotiated 
away, id. at 732, then plaintiffs will always have a high burden to show that the defendants are 
acting systematically or vindictively—as opposed to simply bargaining hard every time.  Justice 
Brennan made the same point in dissent, noting that the Solicitor General all but conceded that 
the United States would routinely seek fee waivers in the future.  Id. at 758 n.12. 
 121. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics of the N.Y. City Bar Ass’n, Op. 1987-4 
(1987). 
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Court and the state bar ethics boards, little room was left for district 
court judges to say that any particular Evans offer was impermissible. 
In practice, the two examples suggested by the Court—that fee 
waivers might undermine the Fees Act if done “systematically” or out 
of “vindictiveness”—have been unavailing.122  In the late 1980s, a few 
lawyers tried to use these exceptions to get Evans offers overturned.  
These lawyers were unsuccessful.  In Willard v. City of Los Angeles123 
and Panola Land Buying Association v. Clark,124 the courts counseled 
a hands-off approach.  The Willard court said that in an individual 
damages action, unlike in a class action, the court had no duty 
whatsoever to scrutinize the settlement.125  The Panola court said that 
once a case settles, “the court need not and should not get 
involved.”126  Moreover, both courts found that the lawyer lacked 
standing to pursue the fee claim because the claim belonged 
exclusively to the client.127 
Since Willard and Panola, claims of defense violations of the Fees 
Act have been almost non-existent.128  No federal court has struck 
 
 122. See, e.g., Note, Fee as the Wind Blows: Waivers of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil 
Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., 102 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1284 (1989); de Lisser, supra 
note 62, at 574 (both arguing that courts should enforce the Evans “bad faith” exceptions, but 
noting that no court has shown an inclination to do so).  As a practical matter, Evans offers are 
now routinely made by defense counsel without any risk that a district or appellate court will 
find fault with them. 
 123. 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 124. 844 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 125. Willard, 803 F.2d at 527–28. 
 126. Panola, 844 F.2d at 1508.  One commentator has argued that these two decisions 
“eviscerate judicial review” of Evans offers, noting that only one in a hundred civil rights cases 
is a class action in which settlement must be approved by the court.  Note, Fee as the Wind 
Blows: Waivers of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., supra 
note 122, at 1287. 
 127. The problem, of course, is that the lawyer would only be seeking the court’s help 
because the client had accepted an offer that deprived the lawyer of her fees and had refused to 
cooperate in challenging the offer.  Standing will operate as a procedural bar in nearly every 
such case if the lawyer cannot raise the fee issue without the client’s cooperation.  Nor is it clear 
how the plaintiff would ever compile a record to support a claim of the systemic or vindictive 
use of Evans offers in a case.  To do so would require discovery, at a point where the case is 
essentially over.  Note, Fee as the Wind Blows: Waiver of Attorney’s Fees in Individual Civil 
Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., supra note 122, at 1283 (noting that problems of proof 
would doom such an effort).  See also Goldstein, supra note 35, at 283. 
 128. The lack of litigation on the issue is unsurprising—especially after Willard and 
Panola—for who would bring such a claim?  If the plaintiff accepts the Evans offer, the lawyer is 
left on her own, with no standing.  If the plaintiff accepts the offer but still agrees to cooperate 
with the lawyer in her quest for fees, the plaintiff risks losing the offer, because under Evans the 
district court cannot undo the fee agreement but still enforce the settlement on the merits.  And 
if the plaintiff rejects the Evans offer, but wants to challenge the fact that the defense made the 
offer, the district court can simply duck the issue, as the court did in Panola. 
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down an Evans offer on the grounds of impermissible “systematic” 
abuse or “vindictiveness.”129  One case, though, bears comment.  In 
Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County,130 an allegedly pro se plaintiff131 filed 
suit, complaining that the defendants’ blanket policy of demanding 
fee waivers undermined the Fees Act in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause.  She argued that the policy had the long-term effect of 
preventing her from finding any private civil rights lawyer willing to 
take her case.132  The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of her complaint and granted her a limited preliminary 
injunction, barring the County from making a settlement “that 
inhibits, interferes with, or prohibits her counsel from applying for 
attorney’s fees under [section 1988].”133  On remand, the district court 
dismissed the case, despite the plaintiff’s lawyer’s ardent efforts to 
prove that a civil rights plaintiff with a low-damages case could not 
find a private lawyer to represent her in all of Los Angeles County.134 
What is most striking about Bernhardt is that it cites no other case 
(apart from Willard, decided seventeen years earlier) from any 
jurisdiction raising the Evans exceptions.135  The Evans offer has 
become an accepted practice in civil rights litigation, exactly as Justice 
 
 129. One rare exception is Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 552 A.2d 141 (N.J. 1989), where the 
court held that, for public policy reasons, thenceforth in New Jersey parties must settle the 
merits of state consumer fraud act cases before the negotiation of statutory claims for fees—but 
only in cases where the plaintiffs are represented by non-profit public interest lawyers.  The 
court prohibited Evans offers in that limited situation.  Similarly, in Johnson v. District of 
Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42–46 (D.D.C. 2002), the court distinguished the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), from 
section 1988, and found that allegations of “a consistent policy and practice of requiring fee 
waivers” or “an intentional or vindictive attempt to prevent plaintiffs . . . from recovering fees” 
could violate the fee provisions of the IDEA. 
 130. 339 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 131. The Court of Appeals seemed appropriately skeptical that the pro se plaintiff was in 
fact bringing the case on her own.  Reading between the lines, it appears that private plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were behind the case and were doing all the legal work, in an effort to circumvent the 
procedural and substantive hurdles that prevented them from raising the issue in their own 
cases, at the point when the Evans offer was made.  Id. at 924. 
 132. In an earlier appeal the court had held that even if the plaintiff could not prove actual 
damages, she “still may be entitled to nominal damages on the basis that the County’s policy 
interfered with her implied federal right to obtain counsel in a civil rights action.”  Id. at 872. 
 133. Id. at 932. 
 134. See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 101 Fed. App’x 244 (9th Cir. June 17, 2004); 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 101 Fed. App’x 244 (9th Cir. 
June 17, 2004) (No. 04-55385), 2004 WL 1125747. 
 135. The most likely reason why there has been no litigation on this issue is that there are no 
litigators: the private plaintiffs’ lawyers who would profit from such a claim no longer handle the 
cases in which the claim would need to be brought.  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 112, at 539, 
607 (arguing that private for-profit plaintiffs civil rights lawyers are a vanishing breed). 
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Brennan predicted.  Smart defendants demand a fee waiver or fee 
reduction.  Smart plaintiffs almost always accept the offer, leaving 
their lawyer with little or no fee and with no incentive ever to bring a 
low-damages or injunctive-relief civil rights action again.  The 
limitations on defense conduct suggested by the majority in Evans 
have proven to be illusory.  At this point, Evans offers are beyond 
challenge due to procedural bars or practical obstacles, or because no 
private plaintiffs’ lawyers are handling the cases in which such a 
challenge would be made.136  The one avenue left open in Evans (that 
might have brought “private attorneys general” back to their forsaken 
civil rights practices) has proven to be a dead end. 
C. A Note on the Data 
I have reported the death of section 1983 (for plaintiffs with low-
damages cases and for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief) based on 
my own experience trying to refer people to the private bar, and 
based on what is common knowledge within the plaintiffs’ bar.137  But 
tracing the death of section 1983 for these plaintiffs statistically is 
problematic.  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts tracks the 
number of civil cases and civil rights cases filed in the federal district 
courts each year.138  The Office further breaks down civil rights cases 
 
 136. The unique exception is Bernhardt, which required two trips to the Ninth Circuit to get 
a limited injunction barring an Evans offer in a single case for a claim that was ultimately 
rejected and affirmed on appeal.  The plaintiff’s attorney presumably recovered no fee for his 
three trips to the Ninth Circuit. 
 137. If you have doubts about the validity of my experience or the common knowledge of 
the plaintiffs’ bar, take this challenge: make up a good-liability/bad-damages or injunctive relief 
civil rights case, and go shopping for a lawyer.  You will get lots of free or reduced-fee initial 
intake interviews, and you will visit a host of small law offices.  The good lawyers will tell you 
the truth—that you have a valid claim but that no good lawyer will ever take it, because she 
cannot make money on the case.  The bad lawyers will hem and haw before saying no, or they 
will refer you down the food chain.  Eventually you may find a new or desperate lawyer who will 
say yes, but probably not.  Even if you do, you will one day regret it: the lawyer will not be up to 
the task of handling a civil rights action, or, more likely, as her hours and costs exceed any 
possible recovery, she will desperately try to get rid of your case.  Good lawyers know that 
without a fee-shifting law that operates as Congress intended, they cannot make money on these 
cases. 
 138. See Chart, attached as the Appendix.  The chart is a compilation of the data supplied by 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts annually (or in five-year increments) from 1975 to 
2006.  See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006 ANNUAL 
REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR, tbls. C-2 and/or C-2A, Civil Cases Commenced by Basis of 
Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit (1976–2006) (collected and reported by calendar year), 1997–
2006 reports, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.  See also OFFICE OF 
JUDGES PROGRAM, STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006 
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into five subcategories, namely voting cases, employment cases, 
welfare cases, housing cases, and other cases.139  (Prisoners’ civil rights 
cases are counted separately.)140 
The government’s data are unhelpful for evaluating the effects of 
Evans for several reasons.  First, they do not track whether the cases 
were filed pro se or with a lawyer.  We therefore cannot measure 
changes in the levels of representation as a result of Evans (or any 
other cases or statutory amendments making civil rights practice more 
or less attractive to the private plaintiffs’ bar).  Second, the data do 
not track whether the cases involved low, medium, or high damages,141 
or if the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief.  We therefore cannot chart 
changes in the levels of representation relative to the amount or type 
of relief sought.142 
Third, in three of the four subcategories of civil rights cases—
voting, welfare, and housing—the numbers are so low as to be 
statistically insignificant.  Those three subcategories account for only 
about .03 percent of all civil rights cases—a figure that has been 
 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (collected and reported by calendar year), 2001–
2007 reports, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseloadstatistics.html. 
 139. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975–2006 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE 
DIRECTOR, tbls. C-2 and/or C-2A, CIVIL CASES COMMENCED BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF SUIT (1976–2007) (collected and reported by calendar year).  The data come from 
the mandatory cover sheets that must be filed with every federal district court complaint.  The 
statistics are thus based on self-reporting of the most limited kind, taken from what the plaintiff 
(if pro se) or the plaintiff’s lawyer writes on the cover sheet form. 
 140. The issue of prisoners’ rights cases is beyond the scope of this Article.  Evans and 
Buckhannon had the same effect on prisoners’ rights cases that they had on every other civil 
rights practice area, the main difference being that so few lawyers were willing to take prisoners’ 
rights cases even before Evans.  If there were any private lawyers still handling low-damages or 
injunctive-relief prisoners’ rights cases after Evans, Congress put them out of business in 1996.  
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 
1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 
1915, 1915A; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h), modified section 1988 to limit attorney’s fees in 
prison cases to 150 percent of any damages won and to no more than 150 percent of the hourly 
rate received by court-appointed counsel, effectively reducing the hourly rate to a fraction of 
the “market rate” allowed in all other civil rights cases.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2007).  Today, 
unless a prisoner has died or suffered some egregious injury, no private plaintiffs’ lawyer will 
look at the case.  Fee shifting has been taken out of the equation in this setting as well—the one 
setting where serious constitutional violations are likely to occur with regularity, but produce 
low or modest damages (because the injured plaintiffs will have neither compensable medical 
costs nor work-loss claims). 
 141. Even if the ad damnum clause—the amount requested by way of relief—were included 
in the data, it would be close to meaningless.  Plaintiffs have little choice but to plead high 
damages in all cases either (a) to meet the court’s jurisdictional limit, or (b) to avoid being 
impeached with their pleadings at trial. 
 142. Because filing pro se is no easy matter, for comparative purposes I will treat the data as 
if all cases were filed by attorneys, every year. 
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roughly constant over the last thirty years.  Plainly, voting rights,143 
welfare,144 and housing145 are highly specialized practices; there is no 
generalized legal “market” for such cases among the private plaintiffs’ 
bar.  Fourth, employment cases—which have accounted for close to 
half of all civil rights cases over the years146—are atypical civil rights 
cases when it comes to tracking the effects of fee-shifting.  They tend 
to be higher-damages cases, and they present other opportunities for 
the lawyer to be paid, so that arguably fee-shifting plays a different 
role.147 
As a result, the most useful statistical category may be the catch-
all category of “other” civil rights cases—the mixture of cases that 
does not fit more comfortably into voting, welfare, housing, or 
 
 143. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138.  Since 1976, on average only 199 voting civil rights 
cases have been filed a year.  The numbers fluctuate somewhat, with the peaks predictably tied 
to election year cycles.  For 2005, 166 voting cases were filed out of more than 36,096 total civil 
rights cases.  Id. 
 144. Id.  Since 1976, on average only 138 welfare civil rights cases have been filed per year.  
Nearly all of these cases must have been filed by LSC lawyers, whose clients are often on 
welfare and therefore would be the people affected by state laws or policies (relating to federal 
assistance programs) that violate federal law.  This intuition is supported by the fact that from 
1976 to 1996, welfare civil rights case filings averaged 167 cases a year, while after 1996 the 
average number dropped to sixty-eight cases a year.  Recall that 1996 was the year Congress 
placed restrictions on LSC lawyers’ ability to handle so-called “impact litigation.”  See supra 
note 10. 
 145. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138.  Since 1976, an average of 642 housing civil rights 
cases have been filed a year.  The housing cases—unlike voting and welfare cases—can include 
significant damages.  The private bar often can afford to take these cases, especially if there is 
evidence of intentional discrimination.  In my part of the country, these cases are typically 
brought with the cooperation of a fair housing center or similar consumer “testing” 
organization.  If testing confirms the plaintiff’s account of overt discrimination, private lawyers 
are willing to take the cases on the theory that they can win on summary judgment or get an 
early settlement.  The number of violations is low enough today that few lawyers are going to 
build a practice exclusively out of housing civil rights cases, but the nature of the proof and the 
risk of relatively high damages make it harder for defense counsel to make plausible Evans 
offers in these cases. 
 146. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138. 
 147. Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers are different from plaintiffs’ tort lawyers in the way 
they evaluate a case.  In an employment case, the typical plaintiff has been ill-treated in some 
way on the job: the case presents an issue of hiring, firing, promotion, unfair treatment, or 
hostile work environment.  Successful employment plaintiffs may thus win something—a job, a 
promotion, or a wage-based judgment—out of which the lawyer can reasonably expect to be 
paid.  In this sense, employment plaintiffs with relatively modest claims are not like tort 
plaintiffs: they are more likely to find a lawyer to represent them with or without fee-shifting, 
because the lawyer has a greater chance of making money on the case.  But see Davies, supra 
note 34, at 234–35 (noting that employment lawyers will not represent blue-collar workers (who 
are unlikely to be able to pay) absent a good chance of winning punitive damages).  And even in 
employment cases, the perception within the plaintiffs’ bar is that lawyers are fleeing the 
specialty because the law has changed enough that they cannot reliably make money on the 
cases.  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 112, at 538 n.6, 539. 
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employment.  Accordingly, if we look at both total filings and “other” 
civil rights filings, the results are slightly more revealing.  They show a 
steady increase in cases filed after the passage of the Fees Act in 
1976.148  Indeed, in the decade from 1976 to 1985, the “other” civil 
rights filings increased by seventy-seven percent, while all civil rights 
filings increased by fifty-nine percent.149 
After Evans came down in 1986, “other” civil rights claims and 
total civil rights claims dropped until 1991,150 when passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 brought a flood of new civil rights filings, 
which peaked five years later in 1997.151  Since 1997, the “other” civil 
rights filings have been virtually flat, while the total number of civil 
rights filings has dropped about seventeen percent.152 
The available data say little about the effect of Evans (or 
Buckhannon or other cases).  When new civil rights statutes are 
passed, lots of new cases are filed for a while, and thereafter lawyers 
modify their practices in response to their experience.  In the two 
decades since Evans, private plaintiffs’ lawyers have stopped taking 
low-damages and injunctive-relief civil rights cases because the 
lawyers have learned that they cannot make money on them. 
 
 148. Brand, supra note 30, at 362 n.416, (quoting Robert A. Diamond, The Firestorm Over 
Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A.B.A. J. 1420 (1983)), reports a sixty-six percent increase in civil 
rights filings in the five years after passage of the Fees Act.  But Diamond was including 
prisoners’ civil rights cases as well.  Because prisoners have only limited access to the private 
bar, it makes little sense to include them for purposes of measuring the effects of Evans. 
 149. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138.  Of course, the total of all civil filings in all 
categories of cases went up ninety-five percent, so it is hard to attribute the rise in civil rights 
cases solely to the passage of the Fees Act. 
 150. Id.  Again, all civil filings declined in the same period, so attributing the decline to 
Evans is unreliable. 
 151. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts itself notes that civil rights filings tend to 
jump in the years following the passage of a new civil rights act (for example, disability 
law/handicap rights, fair housing, children’s rights), but then level off or even decline “as 
Supreme Court decisions and legislative actions offset the impact of the original legislation.”  
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF HUMAN RES. & STATISTICS FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD: RECENT TRENDS at 10 n.9 (1997–2001), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/recenttrends2001/20015yr.pdf. (quoting ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, ANALYTICAL SERVICES OFFICE REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL 
STATISTICS ON INCREASES IN CIVIL RIGHTS FILINGS (Feb. 1998)).  Lawyers move out of the 
new practice area as they find it less lucrative than they had expected it to be. 
 152. See Appendix, Chart, supra note 138.  The decline came mostly from the steep drop in 
employment cases, which fell by twenty-nine percent from 1997 to 2005.  Id. 
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V.  THE FIX 
Congress can easily revitalize section 1983 by amending the Fees 
Act to undo Evans.153  Justice Brennan laid out the fix in his dissent: 
permit limited simultaneous negotiation of merits and fees, but 
require court review of all settlements (not just in class actions) and 
prohibit settlements in which the plaintiffs’ lawyers do not earn 
reasonable fees.154  In this way attorney’s fees can still be negotiated 
across a range of outcomes,155 but in the end the parties will have to 
live with the court’s decision on the reasonableness of the fee, or they 
will have to withdraw their agreement and try the case.  The district 
court will police settlements using a standard of review based on the 
underlying policy of the Fees Act: that reasonable attorney’s fees are 
necessary in every case to ensure that civil rights plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims can find private lawyers to represent them. 
Regarding Buckhannon, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurring 
opinion,156 Congress need only change a few words in section 1988 to 
make it clear that the term “prevailing party” can include any 
favorable result linked to the filing of the lawsuit.  Once the statute 
specifically adopts the catalyst theory of attorney’s fees, the incentive 
structure will be restored to what it was before 2001, and more private 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will accept civil rights cases seeking only equitable 
relief (assuming the Evans problem is fixed at the same time).157 
 
 153. Congress amended the Fees Act in 1991, see supra note 113, but it did not overturn 
Evans.  See, e.g., Cmty. Care Centers v. Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 716 N.E.2d 519, 535 
n.26 (Ind. App. 1999) (citing Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief 
Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 923, 949 n.119 (1993) (noting that although Congress considered overruling Evans, that 
provision did not make it in to the final version of the bill)). 
 154. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 753–54 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 155. The negotiation could proceed along the lines of what happens currently when the 
plaintiff wins at trial and submits a formal fee petition: the defense typically challenges the rate, 
the number of hours, the success on the various claims, duplication of effort by co-counsel, etc.  
The defense could also seek to trade some of the fees for better relief.  The defense may well be 
able persuade the court to reduce the requested fees considerably, but at the same time the 
court will ensure that the prevailing plaintiff is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees to fulfill the 
purposes of the Act—to attract private attorneys general to litigate civil rights cases that 
otherwise would not be brought if left to the private tort market. 
 156. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 622 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 157. Justice Scalia would prefer to see a higher standard—“at least a substantial likelihood 
that the party requesting fees would have prevailed”—to prevent plaintiffs from extorting 
attorney’s fees from defendants in weak cases.  Id.  If the plaintiffs’ case is weak, however, then 
the defendants should have greater leverage in the negotiation, both on the merits and on the 
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The incentives built in to section 1988 can be quickly and easily 
restored.  Individual plaintiffs with strong civil rights claims but low 
damages would again be able to get their cases to court, and liable 
defendants would again have every reason to resolve these cases 
early, thus promoting efficient docket control.  The deterrent effect of 
section 1983 would also be restored, as defendants would have to 
conform their conduct to the requirements of the law or pay both 
damages and attorney’s fees for any breach.  Finally, access to justice 
would not be limited to the lucky few in big cities in populous states 
but would be equally available everywhere that lawyers hang a 
shingle.158 
CONCLUSION 
[I]t does not require a sociological study to see that permitting fee 
waivers will make it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to 
obtain legal assistance.  It requires only common sense.159 
When Evans came down in 1986, its potential to alter existing civil 
rights practice was clear.  The parties addressed it in their briefs, and 
the Justices debated it in their opinions.  The academic reaction was 
swift and negative.  Nevertheless, in the two decades since, the issue of 
access to the courts has all but dropped off the radar screen. 
In my view, the absence of ongoing debate on Evans is 
understandable.  The plaintiffs who lost their access to the courts are 
random civil rights or “constitutional tort” victims.  We cannot identify 
them, and they cannot identify each other.  They share nothing 
beyond the fact of having a claim cognizable under  section 1983 for 
violation of their rights.  As a group they have no political power and 
no means to organize.  Without lawyers, no one is going to speak for 
them, let alone with a strong or unified voice. 
 
fees (as well as in persuading the district court that a lower fee is reasonable under the 
circumstances). 
 158. Other commentators have floated more elaborate or more drastic proposals, but in my 
view the simplest fix is the best.  See, e.g., Elledge, supra note 35, at 1034–36; Krulewitch, supra 
note 31, at 128 (both recommending banning fee waivers); Stedman, supra note 31, at 1308–19 
(advocating a full rewrite of the law); Sternlight, supra note 112, at 599–606 (advocating a 
panoply of amendments, including higher hourly rates, contingency and delay enhancements, 
fees for administrative work, prohibition of fee waivers, expert witness fees, and fees against 
intervenors); McCormick, supra note 35, at 416 (urging the prohibition of fee waivers). 
 159. Evans, 475 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Likewise, the lawyers who represented them and whose practices 
Evans destroyed were not the rich and powerful members of the high-
end plaintiffs’ personal-injury bar.  Rather, they were mostly solo or 
small-firm practitioners with mixed civil practices, for whom fee-
shifting provided a way to widen their services to include low-
damages or injunctive-relief civil rights cases.  When Evans caused the 
market for civil rights cases to crash, these lawyers simply slid across 
to other specialties where they could earn a living. 
Accordingly, unless something galvanizes Congress to act on its 
own, as Alyeska did in 1975, no constituency exists to advocate for the 
rights of plaintiffs with strong civil rights claims but low damages, or 
plaintiffs who need injunctive relief to cure a civil rights violation.  
Especially in the 1990s, when Congress was doing everything it could 
to limit access to the courts, the unfairness of Evans got little 
attention.  Nor was the state defense bar ever going to raise the issue.  
In Evans, the defense bar won an epic victory for its state-actor 
clients, blocking injured plaintiffs from ever getting to court.  The 
defense bar knows when to bite its tongue. 
On the other hand, the benefits of using “private attorneys 
general” to enforce civil rights laws are legion, as the sponsors and 
supporters of the Fees Act were well aware in 1976.  First, private 
lawyers are not geographically limited.  Fee-shifting creates the same 
powerful incentive across the country, in big cities and in small towns, 
wherever lawyers work.  Fee-shifting harnesses their self-interest and 
turns it to the public good in a ubiquitous market.  Second, “private 
attorneys general” require neither infrastructure nor support.  No 
public funds have to be spent on their recruitment, staffing, training, 
organization, or oversight.  They even tend to establish their own 
centers of expertise, as they trade information and create networks in 
the same ways that other legal specialists do. 
Third, “private attorneys general” are supremely efficient.  Until 
Evans, the Fees Act was a quiet but powerful engine of justice, 
righting legal wrongs as Congress intended.  The engine was fueled by 
profit, but the profit was modest, at reasonable market rates.  
Congress understood that if defendants could be made to pay the 
costs of their malfeasance, private lawyers would step forward to do 
the work, with the exemplary efficiency of any other market.  Fourth, 
“private attorneys general” are self-policing.  Because they can only 
make money on meritorious cases, they tend to filter out the very 
01__REINGOLD_FINAL.DOC 7/23/2008  9:32:30 AM 
2008] REQUIEM FOR SECTION 1983 45 
cases that Congress would want filtered out—namely nuisance 
lawsuits and other meritless actions.160 
Justice Brennan was right: today plaintiffs with low damages or 
those seeking injunctive relief have no remedy under section 1983, 
because no lawyers will take their cases to court.  Evans dismantled 
the mechanism that funded the “private attorneys general” who gave 
life and meaning to the Civil Rights Act.  The death of section 1983 
for these plaintiffs is not an exaggeration, and Congress should take 
immediate steps to resurrect it by amending the Fees Act. 
 
 160. Requiring closer judicial supervision of all fee awards will serve as a further screening 
device, discouraging lawyers who might otherwise bring weak cases in an effort to “extort” fees 
from defendants. 
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APPENDIX 
Year Voting Employment Housing Welfare Other Total All 
Cases 
1975 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10,392 117,320 
1976 176 5,321 531 222 6,079 12,329 130,597 
1977 203 5,931 442 219 6,318 13,113 130,567 
1978 139 5,504 497 214 6,475 12,829 138,770 
1979 145 5,477 434 195 6,917 13,168 154,666 
1980 160 5,017 342 212 7,213 12,944 168,789 
1981 152 6,245 336 253 8,433 15,419 180,576 
1982 170 7,689 237 215 8,727 17,038 206,193 
1983 175 9,097 296 229 9,938 19,735 241,842 
1984 259 9,748 291 183 10,738 21,219 261,485 
1985 281 8,082 253 180 10,757 19,553 273,670 
1986 194 9,174 230 164 10,366 20,128 254,828 
1987 214 8,993 323 158 10,117 19,805 239,185 
1988 347 8,563 322 129 9,962 19,323 239,634 
1989 183 9,000 334 122 9,739 19,378 233,529 
1990 130 8,413 341 129 9,780 18,793 217,879 
1991 247 8,370 452 130 10,693 19,892 210,890 
1992* 494 10,771 527 125 12,316 24,233 230,509 
1993 213 12,962 590 114 13,776 27,655 229,850 
1994 224 15,965 730 122 15,581 32,622 236,391 
1995 208 19,059 735 116 16,482 36,600 248,335 
1996 229 23,152 932 83 17,611 42,007 269,132 
1997 141 23,796 854 91 18,396 43,278 272,027 
1998 108 23,735 838 66 17,607 42,354 256,787 
1999 102 22,490 1,136 63 17,513 41,304 260,271 
2000 167 21,032 1,284 80 18,345 40,908 259,517 
2001 195 21,157 1,249 61 18,248 40,910 250,907 
2002 234 20,955 1,313 71 17,847 40,420 274,841 
2003 147 20,507 1,315 65 18,482 40,516 252,962 
2004 173 19,746 1,222 61 19,037 40,239 281,338 
2005 166 16,930 885 54 18,061 36,096 253,273 
2006** 150 14,353 643 56 17,663 32,865 259,541 
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Where figures do not match year-to-year, I have used the figures 
compiled or reported at the latest date.  The Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts notes that it adjusts its figures as better data become 
available, and that the latest figures are the most accurate.  Thus, for 
example, if the 1992 chart also shows the figures for the previous year 
(1991), I use the figures from the 1992 chart, assuming that they have 
been updated from the originally reported 1991 figures. 
* Current year figures used because current year figures were the 
only available source 
** Incomplete partial-year statistics 
